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The proposed Magistrate Act of 19791 will, if passed, mark the
second recent expansion of the evolving powers of the United States
magistrate, a judicial office created by the Federal Magistrates Act of
1968.2 The 1979 Act's chief innovation is a consensual-reference pro-
vision that allows magistrates to hear any civil case with district court
permission and litigant consent.3 Although some courts already sanc-
tion consensual magistratd trials, 4 the 1979 Act would supply such
1. H.R. 1046, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) & S. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (amend-
ing 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-636, 1915 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976)) [hereinafter cited with-
out cross-reference as the 1979 Act or, when Senate and House drafts differ, as 1979 Senate
Bill or 1979 House Bill]. The Senate bill is similar to, and the House bill identical to,
earlier legislation that narrowly failed enactment in 1978. See S. 1613, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), reirinted as amended by the House in H.R. REP. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 1364]. The purpose of the 1979 Act is to
clarify and expand magistrate jurisdiction and to improve public access to the courts.
H.R. REP. 1364, supra, at 4.
2. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402 (1976)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-639 (1976)) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 1968
Act].
3. 1979 House Bill § 2(2) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976)); 1979 Senate Bill § 2(2)
(same).
The 1979 House bill provides that once a magistrate has been designated to exercise
jurisdiction in a given case, that designation will be communicated to the parties who
may choose to consent. The judge, however, is not to be "informed of the parties' response
to this notice, nor shall he attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to refer-
ence of any civil matter to a magistrate." 1979 House Bill § 2(2). In addition, the bill
provides for appeal of the magistrate's decision to the district judge. Alternatively, the
parties may agree prior to the magistrate's judgment that his decision will be dispositive
at the district court level, and appeal is allowed directly to the United States court of
appeals. Id. The corresponding provision of the 1979 Senate bill differs in at least two
respects: it implicitly permits district courts to designate categories of cases for magistrate
trial through local rules, and it requires parties desiring a right of appeal in the circuit
courts to indicate "further consent" prior to initiation of the magistrate trial, rather than
before entry of final judgment. See H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 12-13 (1979 House
bill bars assignment of categories of cases to magistrates). Compare 1979 House Bill § 2(2)
with 1979 Senate Bill § 2(2).
4. During the year ending June 30, 1977, magistrates in 36 districts conducted 325
civil trials. Hearings on Diversity of CitizenshiP/Magistrate Reform before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
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trials with explicit authorization and clear guidelines-including pro-
visions for either district or circuit court appeal of magistrate deci-
sions--that promise to transform the hitherto experimental procedure
into a commonplace district court practice.6
This Note argues that consensual trial by magistrate presents both a
danger of serious new Article III problems and an opportunity to
reassess the risks that accompany existing magistrate delegation prac-
tices. The opportunity for reassessment arises from the problems that
consensual reference shares with an older, nonconsensual statutory
procedure that permits magistrates to preside over evidentiary hearings
on prisoner petitions and to "recommend" disposition of the under-
lying claims.8 The new danger stems from long-term changes in the
structure of the district courts that may accompany the expanded use
of consensual reference.
Part I of the Note sketches the magistrate system and discusses the
general Article III limits on Congress's authority to sanction district
court delegation of judicial power to untenured court officers. The
analysis contrasts such internal delegation of judicial power with the
congressional allocation of jurisdiction between Article I and Article
III tribunals9 and concludes that internal delegation constitutes the
greater potential threat to the policies underlying Article III.
Part II examines the specific Article III delegation problems related
to nonconsensual evidentiary hearings conducted by magistrates in
prisoner petition cases and consensual trials conducted by magistrates
in other civil cases. When the magistrate functions as a judicial adviser,
as in hearings on prisoner petitions, the delegation problem arises from
Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 499 (1977) (memorandum prepared by Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts and U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hear-
ings]. At present, district courts authorize magistrate trials under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)
(1976), which allows magistrates to assume "such additional duties as are not inconsistent
with the Constitution or laws of the United States," or under id. § 636(b)(2) (1976), which
permits magistrates to serve as special masters. See note 43 infra (consensual special master
reference).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. It has been estimated that, if the Act is passed, by 1983 the number of magistrate
trials will triple, H.R. REP. 1364, supra note I, at 23, or quadruple, 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 4, at 499. Although the totals (1,000-1,325) projected by both estimates are
dwarfed by aggregate district court caseloads, these totals are simple short-term extrapo-
lations of present district court practices. See id. In the long run, the number of magis-
trate trials may be much higher. See pp. 1049-50 infra.
7. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976) (recommended disposition of prisoner petitions
and dispositive pretrial motions in other cases).
9. Article III tribunals include the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts created
pursuant to Congress's power to establish the inferior courts of the United States. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article I tribunals embrace courts and administrative forums that
are established under one of Congress's particular Article I powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
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Federal Magistrates
the risk of de facto magistrate adjudication. In consensual-reference
cases, by contrast, the magistrate serves openly as an independent ad-
judicator.'0 Here the Article III difficulties center less on the conduct
of individual trials than on the longrun risk of a dramatic increase in
the proportion of the civil caseload handled by magistrates in busy
districts. Such an increase might itself come to violate Article III con-
straints. It would also raise numerous other issues, ranging from dis-
crimination among litigants to "quasi-jurisdictional" decisionmaking
by district judges, inadequate magistrate independence, and a subtle
erosion of the judiciary's constitutional mandate. Part III of the Note
discusses the implications for legislative action of the specific Article
III problems raised by magistrate adjudication.
I. The Magistrate System and Article III
A. The Magistrate System
The magistrate is an untenured federal judicial officer who serves
as a highly versatile assistant of the district judge. Although most
magistrates are part-time officers, the core of the system is an expand-
ing body of full-time magistrates," who are well-paid, eight-year ap-
pointees of the district court and whose status is comparable to that of
the bankruptcy judge.12 Magistrate selection now falls entirely to the
10. The 1979 Act would transform the magistrate into the functional equivalent of a
judge for purposes of individual references. See note 3 suPra (citing bill). But see note 181
infra (magistrate adjudication would remain less formal than judicial trial). The magis-
trate's status under present forms of consensual reference is more complex. See note 43
infra (consensual special master reference).
I1. As of the close of fiscal 1977, the Judicial Conference had authorized 164 full-time
magistrates and 305 part-time magistrates. [1977] AD. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 138.
Nevertheless, full-time magistrates account for 74% of all magistrate work and a still
higher percentage of more discretionary magistrate tasks. Id. at 292-94. Like the bank-
ruptcy system after which its administration was modeled, the magistrate system is con-
verting from part-time to full-time positions as the magistrate's powers expand. See Hear-
ings on S. 1612 & S. 1613, the Magistrate Act of 1977, Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
inents in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 26
(1977) (statement of Peter McCabe) [hereinafter cited as the 1977 Senate Hearings].
12. In 1977, salaries of full-time magistrates ranged from $39,600 to 546,500. 1977 House
Hearings, supra note 4, at 184 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Daniel Meador). The top
1978 salary for a magistrate is estimated at $48,500, which is $6,000 less than the com-
parable salary of a newly appointed district judge. Id. at 502. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1976)
provides that a full-time magistrate's salary may not be reduced below the level fixed at
the beginning of his term.
A magistrate may be removed from office "only for incompetency, misconduct, neglect
of duty, or physical or mental disability." Id. § 631(h). Removal requires a majority vote
of judges in a district. Id. At present, the salary, tenure, appointment, and dismissal
provisions governing the magistrate's office are similar to those of bankruptcy judgeships.
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discretion of the district courts.' 3 However, the sensitive nature of the
magistrate's proposed responsibilities under the 1979 Act and the
present "unevenness" in magistrate competence 14 have prompted the
drafters of the Act to tighten magistrate qualifications by requiring
five years of membership in the bar prior to appointment 3 and by
instituting merit selection procedures to guide district court selec-
tions. 1 These measures could only enhance the already considerable
reputation enjoyed by many magistrates,' 7 but of course they would
not-and are not intended to-establish parity of qualifications between
magistrates and judges. In their presumptive expertise, authority,
prestige, support services, and, most importantly, in their constitu-
tional status and protections of office, magistrates would remain sub-
ordinate members of the district court.'
8
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 62, 68(a) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 634(a) (1976). However, the recent Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 will sharply upgrade the status of bankruptcy judgeships by, inter
alia, increasing the tenure of bankruptcy judges from 6 to 14 years and providing for
presidential rather than district court appointment. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
95-598, tit. 2, ch. 6, §§ 152, 153, 47 U.S.L.W. 35 (1978).
13. Individual magistrates are appointed by the concurrence of a majority of a district
court's judges. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976). At present, the primary restriction on district
court discretion is the requirement that appointees be members of the bar in good stand-
ing in the states in which they serve. Id. § 631(b)(1).
14. See H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 17.
15. 1979 House Bill § 3(b). This requirement has been deleted from the 1979 Senate
bill.
16. The 1979 Act would provide for merit selection either through promulgation by
the Judicial Conference of selection standards and procedures, see 1979 Senate Bill § 3,
or by the creation of "Magistrate Selection Panels" that would nominate three to five
candidates for each position, see 1979 House Bill § 3.
17. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 90-91 (testimony of Judge Skopil
on high quality of magistrates in District of Oregon); Committee on Federal Courts of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Magistrate System in the
Southern District of New York 52-53 (Nov. 1977) (emphasizing high quality of magistrates
in Southern District) [hereinafter cited as S.D.N.Y. Magistrate System]. But see 1977
House Hearings, supra note 4, at 385-86 (letter from Chicago Council of Lawyers opposing
passage of S. 1613, precursor of 1979 Act, in part on basis of indifferent quality of magis-
trates in Northern District of Illinois).
18. The 1979 Act seeks only to ensure that magistrates are competent to adjudicate
"cases which do not require those special attributes of Article III judges, but nonetheless
do require an impartial generalist to resolve issues of importance to the parties." H.R.
REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 12. It has been suggested that the typical new magistrate ap-
pointee would be a younger lawyer with five to ten years' experience, who is attracted by
the salary and security of the magistrate post and perhaps motivated by a long-range
career interest in a judicial appointment. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 192-93
(colloquy between Rep. Drinan and Ass't Att'y Gen. Meador).
Magistrates have minimal support services, as compared to judges; for example, they
currently do not have paid law clerks. Id. at 500. In addition, magistrate opinions lack
precedential weight and are currently unpublished. Id. at 67 (Thomas Ehrlich). But the
most basic differences between magistrates and judges arise from the Constitution; Article
III confers status, prestige, and guarantees of independence only on judges. Cf. pp. 1032-
33 infra (policies of Article III's tenure and salary provisions); pp. 1055-56 infra (im-
plications of this difference).
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At present, the magistrate's docket depefds as much on local case-
loads and the reference policies of individual courts and judges as on
any statutory prescription.'9 Nevertheless, certain generalizations are
possible. Aside from routine tasks20 and the trial of minor criminal
offenses, 21 magistrates now serve most frequently as surrogate judges
in pretrial proceedings, 22 as special masters, 23 and as hearing officers in
summary civil actions including prisoner petitions24 and social security
review.2
5
The range of magistrate responsibilities can, in turn, be traced to the
evolution of the office. Much of the original impetus for the magistrate
system stemmed from dissatisfaction with the magistrate's anachronistic
predecessor, the United States Commissioner.2 6 However, the subse-
quent development of the magistrate's authority has been a heuristic
19. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part i: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1297, 1300-01 (1975); see [1977] AD. OFF. U.S. Crs. AtN. RE'. 293-94 (table 51) (com-
parison of magistrate duties in 25 courts); S.D.N.Y. Magistrate System, supra note 17, at
24 (great variation in duties within one district).
20. Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1), (2) (1976), empowers magistrates to perform the
largely ministerial tasks that were once the province of the United States Commissioner.
See note 26 infra.
21. Magistrates are now authorized to try, with the defendant's consent, most mis-
demeanors punishable by up to one-year imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 63 6(a)(3) (1976). The 1979 Act would extend the magistrate's
consensual jurisdiction to all "misdemeanors," which are offenses punishable by up to a
year in prison. 1979 Act § 7. See generally Note, The Validity of Magistrates' Criminal
Jurisdiction, 60 VA. L. REv. 697 (1974).
22. At present, magistrates' most important contributions are in the area of pretrial
proceedings such as pretrial motions and, in criminal cases, postindictment arraignments.
[1977] AD. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REp. 290 (table 48).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976) (magistrate special master appointment). Appoint-
ment of special masters to hear entire cases or evidence on key motions is tightly restricted.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) (limiting nonjury master appointments to "exceptional" condi-
tions); note 76 infra (construction of exceptional conditions). These restrictions apply to
magistrates serving as special masters except when the parties consent to the master
reference. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976); see note 43 infra.
24. Prisoner petitions include habeas corpus petitions and challenges to conditions of
confinement typically brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
25. [1977] AD. OFF. U.S. Cis. ANN. Ra-P. 290 (table 48).
26. See, e.g., 112 CONG. RFc. 12,471 (1966) (Sen. Tydings); Silberman, supra note 19, at
1297-98. The U.S. Commissioner was a minor judicial official who tried petty offenses
committed on federal enclaves and who attended to other, largely ministerial tasks related
to the preliminary stages of the judicial process. See Hearings on the Federal Magistrates
Act Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 261-65 (1966-67) [hereinafter
cited as 1966-67 Senate Hearings]. Among the anachronistic features of commissioners
were their qualifications (a third were nonlawyers) and their fee payments, which allowed
them a potential financial interest in the outcome of cases. See S. RaP. No. 371, 90th
Cong., 1st 8ess. 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. RaP. 371]; H.R. RFP. No. 1629, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11-12 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4252, 4255-57 [here-
inafter cited as H.L REP. 1629].
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process fueled by rising federal caseloads27 and guided in large part by
the courts. The original Magistrates Act of 1968 not only vested the
judiciary with responsibility for staffing and administering the magis-
trate system, 28 but also left the new officer's duties open-ended in order
to encourage district court experimentationY9 In addition, much of the
post-1968 legislation has either systematized magistrate reference tech-
niques pioneered by innovative district courts or removed case-law and
legislative obstacles to their further development.30
This dialogue between judicial experimentation and subsequent
legislative expansion of magistrate authority characterizes the develop-
ment of both of the major avenues of magistrate reference 3' addressed
here: recommended disposition and consensual reference. In brief,
the first of these procedures allows magistrates to hear case-dispositive
matters and file a recommended decision with the presiding judge, but
provides that the parties may request a de novo determination of dis-
27. See [1974] AD. OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 199-205; Silberman, supra note 19, at 1298.
Relief for the overburdened judiciary was also an objective of the 1968 Act. See H.R.
REP. 1629, supra note 26, at 12.
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 633 (1976) (Judicial Conference adjusts numbers, locations, and
salaries of magistrates in light of district court, circuit council, and Director of U.S. Courts
recommendations). On district court appointment of individual magistrates, see note 13
supra.
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976) (permitting district courts to assign magistrates
"such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States"); S. REP. 371, supra note 26, at 26 (judicial experimentation with magistrate
duties not listed in 1968 Act will aid district courts).
30. 1976 Amendments sanctioned the court-developed "recommended disposition" pro-
cedure, see p. 1029 infra, and overruled Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), a
'decision that had temporarily blocked magistrate assignments of evidentiary hearings on
habeas corpus petitions, see pp. 1041-42 infra. In addition, the amendments sanctioned a
limited form of consensual reference of civil cases. See note 43 infra. Yet consensual ref-
erence had received support prior to the amendments. See DeCosta v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). The 1979
Act would explicitly authorize the consensual reference of jury trials, a practice already
pioneered by some district courts. See Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978)
(magistrate jury trial); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 181 (Linda Silberman).
The 1979 Act would also overcome resistance on the part of some courts of appeals to
district court authorization of magistrate final adjudication. See note 136 infra (citing
cases).
31. If the 1979 Act's consensual-reference provision were included, magistrate legisla-
tion would articulate four avenues of potential magistrate participation in the disposition
of an entire civil case. Two would require litigant consent and subject magistrate de-
terminations to a formal standard of review: the 1979 consensual-reference procedure and
consensual master reference. See note 43 infra. The third is nonconsensual and entails
formal review: the magistrate's appointment as a traditional special master under excep-
tional circumstances. See id. The fourth, the recommended-disposition procedure, casts
the magistrate as an adviser and entails "de novo" review. See note 32 infra. In addition
to these procedures, magistrates are empowered to make final determinations of non-
dispositive pretrial motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976), discussed at note 36 infra.
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puted portions of the magistrate's opinion.3 2 Although district courts
employed the recommended-disposition device in a variety of civil con-
texts during the early years of the magistrate system, it remained
vulnerable to the criticism that it amounted to de facto magistrate ad-
judication and extended well beyond the advisory role for magistrates
sketched by the 1968 Act.33 Indeed, its challengers achieved a short-
lived victory in 1974, when the Supreme Court barred use of the pro-
cedure, ostensibly on statutory g1ounds, in the trial and disposition of
habeas corpus petitions that reached the hearing stage.3 4 The Court in
1976, however, approved the device for hearings in social security re-
view actions35 and, almost immediately, the 1976 Amendments to the
1968 Act authorized its application to potentially disposktive pretrial
motions"a and hearings on prisoner applications for post-trial relief.3 7
Like the recommended-disposition procedure, magistrate trial by
consent is also the product of judicial experimentation followed by
legislative vindication. Support for consensual reference existed in the
form of analogous cases authorizing waiver of due process rights in other
contexts, 38 a venerable case law3 9 sanctioning litigant waiver of the
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976).
Generally, however, the judge's de novo determination is based on a review of the
record of the proceedings before the magistrate, and the judge holds no hearing of his
own. See H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
1609]. There is no standard of review for magistrate recommended dispositions; the
presiding judge has complete freedom to modify the magistrate's recommended factual
and legal conclusions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976).
33. See, e.g., Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), discussed at pp. 1041-44 infra;
TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 360 n.62 (7th Cir. 1972) (criticizing recommended
disposition of summary judgment motion). Recommended disposition has also been dis-
allowed as an impermissible special master reference. See Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d
1268, 1270-72 (6th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court distinguished between these two modes of
reference in Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 273 (1976). See Gallagher, An Expanding
Civil Role for United States Magistrates, 26 Ast. U.L. Rav. 66, 91-99 (1976). On magistrate
special master appointments, see note 23 supra.
34. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), discussed at pp. 1041-44 infra.
35. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976), discussed in note 116 infra.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976). With respect to all motions that are not
potentially dispositive, the magistrate's determination is final unless "clearly erroneous or
contrary to law." Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
37. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
38. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (criminal defendant may
waive right against self-incrimination when disclosure voluntary); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (criminal defendant waives right to be free from unreasonable
searches). On the civil side, the right to a jury trial may be waived by failure to serve a
demand for one. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
39. See, e.g., Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889) (consensual reference of civil trial
to special master); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1864) (consensual reference of civil trial
to referee). For discussion of premagistrate consensual-reference case law, see DeCosta v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 503-05 (Ist Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1073 (1976); Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 10
U. CHt. L. RaV. 581, 588-89 (1973).
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right to an Article III judge, 40 and the 1968 Act itself, which condi-
tioned the magistrate's criminal jurisdiction on defendant consent. 41
Armed with these precedents and the congressional mandate to ex-
periment, innovative district courts soon developed the waiver principle
into a foundation for civil trial by magistrate. 42 Congress responded in
1976 by sanctioning consensual reference in a limited form that pre-
served an element of formal judicial responsibility for magistrate judg-
ments. 43 The 1979 Act, however, moves much closer toward fashioning
an independent judicial role for the magistrate by authorizing both
magistrate jury trials44 and entry by magistrates of final judgments, 4
and by limiting the supervision of the district judge to two stages: the
selection of cases suitable for consensual reference and the provision of
appellate review.4
6
B. Article III Constraints on the Delegation of Judicial Power
Analysis of the constitutional questions raised by recommended dis-
position and consensual reference must necessarily begin with a dis-
cussion of Article III limits on Congress's power over the lower federal
courts. Although these limits are notoriously murky, their source lies
in Article III's two central features. The first of these features is the
40. "Article III judges" are judges enjoying the constitutional guarantees of life tenure
and irreducible salary specified in that article of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. All Article III judges serve in courts established under Congress's Article
III, § I powers and exercise jurisdiction over some portion of the cases and controversies
enumerated in Article III, § 2. Congress, however, has also established specialized "legisla-
tive" courts and other tribunals under its Article I powers, and the officers of these
forums may also preside over cases within the Article III, § 2 jurisdictional field. See
note 48 infra; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549-51 (1962) (plurality opinion). For
this reason, only the Article III, § I tenure and salary guarantees are both necessary and
sufficient conditions for an Article III judge. Waiver of the right to an Article III judge
is waiver of the right to an adjudicator enjoying these constitutional protections of office.
Throughout this Note, the terms "judge" and "judiciary" refer to Article III judges
unless these terms are otherwise qualified.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976); see note 21 supra (magistrate criminal jurisdiction).
42. See, e.g., Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978); DeCosta v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
43. The 1976 Amendments removed FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) constraints on consensual ap-
pointment of magistrates as special masters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976), discussed at
note 23 supra. This change permits magistrates to hear nonjury civil cases and to reach
factual conclusions reviewable only under a narrow "clearly erroneous" standard. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e). The magistrate/master's legal conclusions remain open to complete
district judge reconsideration. See Gallagher, supra note 33, at 92-94. The 1976 House
Committee report also invited the courts to relax constraints on nonconsensual magistrate/
master references. H.R. REP. 1609, supra note 32, at 12. This invitation has not gone
unheeded. See Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.3 (2d Cir.
1977).
44. 1979 Act § 2(2).
45. Id.




specification of a jurisdictional field for the federal courts by Article
III, section 2 .47 Much of the uncertainty over the actual restrictions
imposed by Article III surrounds Congress's power to ignore this field
by transferring categories of cases from the jurisdiction of the Article
III courts to specialized Article I tribunals.48 It is, however, Article
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty, and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.
48. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WVECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 331-32, 396-97 (2d ed. 1973) (multiple considera-
tions bearing on Congress's power to transfer jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WVECHsLER]. Specialized Article I tribunals presently exercising trial jurisdiction over Article
I1, § 2 cases include territorial courts, the Tax Court, the Court of Military Appeals, and
administrative agencies. See Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 779, 781-89 (1975).
Justice Brandeis expressed one viewpoint on Congress's power to transfer Article III
trial jurisdiction:
The "judicial power" of Article III of the Constitution is the power of the federal
government, and not of any inferior tribunal. There is in that Article nothing which
requires any controversy to be determined as of the first instance in the federal courts.
The jurisdiction of those courts is subject to the control of Congress. Matters which
may be placed within their jurisdiction may instead be committed to the state courts.
If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be
subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legisla-
tive courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of the juris-
diction of the federal district courts as such, but because, under certain circumstances,
the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). This
position is widely cited by commentators on the magistrate system. E.g., 1966-67 Senate
Hearings, suPra note 26, at 254; Silberman, supra note 19, at 1310-11 n.89. Others advance
various models for a jurisdictional core of cases, within the broader range of cases sketched
by Article III, § 2, that cannot be transferred to non-Article III tribunals. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra, at 397 (court-martial case law suggests that federal criminal trials
within state may not be held in Article I tribunals); Note, suPra, at 781-89 (exploring
constraints on jurisdictional transfer). Of course, Article III constraints are not the only
source of limits on Congress's power to transfer jurisdiction; due process considerations
and the inherent limits on Congress's Article I powers may also restrict transfer of
particular classes-of- cases. See note 80 infra (transfer of diversity jurisdiction to Article I
forums outside scope of Congress's power); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (due process restrictions).
Beyond the question of Congress's power to transfer particular categories of cases lies
the starker question of Congress's power to impair or destroy the lower federal courts
through wholesale jurisdictional transfer to Article I tribunals. See HART & WECHSLER,
suPra, at 396. Article III must bar such wholesale transfer if it is to provide the institu-
tion and functions of the federal judiciary with any constitutional protection whatsoever.
Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that Article III bars Congress from restricting the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in ways that impair their contributions to the
constitutional system. See Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
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III's second essential feature, the establishment of a judicial office
protected by life tenure and irreducible compensation,49 that limits
congressional discretion to authorize the delegation of judicial power"°
to untenured officers within the Article III courts. These two Article
III limitations on congressional power, delegation constraints and
limits on jurisdictional transfer, both safeguard the access of individual
litigants to an Article III judge. Nevertheless, these constraints are not
interchangeable; they differ chiefly because Article III's jurisdictional-
field and judicial-office provisions make disparate contributions to the
core functions of the federal judiciary.
The federal courts have never exercised the full scope of their Article
III jurisdiction.51 Instead, from the outset, the federal judiciary has
remained a compact, highly skilled body52 charged with particular tasks
requiring exceptional objectivity and insulation from political pres-
sure.58 In the eyes of the Framers, these tasks ranged from checking the
other two governmental branches54 to assuring the priority of federal
concerns over competing state interests, 5- providing for the uniform
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532-33 (1974). This view, however, must confront a
historic tradition of exclusive state court jurisdiction over the bulk of Article III, § 2
cases. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551-52 (1962) (plurality opinion); Ex Parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 11-12.
49. Article III provides that the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts "shall hold
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 1.
50. The concept of "judicial power" is introduced in Article III, which provides in
part: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
Judicial power may be viewed as the decisionmaking core of the judicial function. The
magistrate case law and literature speak of delegation of judicial power as delegation of
"final" or "ultimate" decisionmaking authority. See note 74 infra (citing cases); Gallagher,
supra note 33, at 81-82.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (amount-in-controversy limitation on federal-question
jurisdiction); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 12-13 (1973) (hy-
pothetical sketch of federal jurisdiction extended to maximum limits of Article III).
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, state courts exercised the bulk of federal-
question jurisdiction. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)) (first permanent grant of general federal-question jurisdic-
tion).
52. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 51, at 29-31.
53. See, e.g., Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv.
483, 492-93 (1928) (vulnerability of state courts to local pressure was initial justification for
federal diversity jurisdiction); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105,
1127-28 (1977) (Article III insulation explains historical preference for federal court
enforcement of constitutional norms).
54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 465-69 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (central
judicial function of checking other branches requires tenure and salary protections); HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 48, at 2, 9-11.
55. See 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 532 (1836) (quoting Madison at Virginia deliberations) ("Con-
troversies affecting the interests of the United States ought to be determined by their own
1032
Federal Magistrates
development of federal law,5 6 guaranteeing an impartial forum for
foreigners and out-of-state litigants, 5 7 and protecting individual rights
within the scope of federal jurisdiction. 58 Although national concerns
have multiplied and the fate of alien litigants in state courts is no
longer suspect, 59 these tasks remain the central functions of the federal
judiciary today. Moreover, their discharge is equally dependent on
the forms of institutional integrity that the tenure and salary provisions
are designed to safeguardO-an integrity that entails uniform6 1 and
competent adjudication, 602 and, above all, judicial decisionmaking free
of any untoward influences. 63
judiciary, and not be left to partial, local tribunals.") [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT DEBATES];
Eisenberg, sufpra note 48, at 505-06. The function of protecting federal interests against
competing state claims merges with the overarching task of the federal judiciary: providing
for ie effective enforcement of federal laws. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton),
supra note 54, at 150-51; Frank, Historical Basis of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 12-13 (1948).
56. See 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124 (1911) (Rutledge
arguing that Supreme Court alone sufficed to ensure protection of national rights and
uniformity of judgments; Madison responding in part that inferior federal tribunals with
final judgment powers were required to prevent explosion of appeals); Eisenberg, supra
note 48, 505-06.
57. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 55, at 492-93 (Wilson at Pennsylvania
deliberations); Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 506. In the case of diversity jurisdiction, the
desire to protect out-of-state litigants may have masked suspicion of both the quality of
state courts and the prodebtor bias of state legislatures. See Frank, supra note 55, at 22-
28; Friendly, supra note 53, at 495-98.
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 54, at 470 (judiciary central to protection
of constitutional and private rights of citizens against unjust laws); HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 48, at 6 n.19.
59. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 51, at 146-47. Legislation to curtail or abolish diversity
jurisdiction has been proposed on numerous occasions over the past decade. For the most
recent unsuccessful attempt, see H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
60. The active, politically vulnerable role played by the federal judiciary over the past
quarter century makes the primary objective of the tenure and salary provisions, the
preservation of judicial independence, especially critical today. See Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 685-90, 716 (1979).
61. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, sukra note 54, at 470-72.
62. See id.
63. The tenure and salary provisions protect multiple forms of judicial independence.
The most important is judicial independence from other branches. See, e.g., O'Donoghue
v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 54, at 465-72.
Yet the provisions also safeguard the integrity of individual judges.
That uniform and inflexible adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of
individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can cer-
tainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by temporary commission.
Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some
way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence.
Id. at 470-71; see Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970) (independence is
required "in any phase of the decisional function"); Kaufman, supra note 60, at 713
(separation of powers is not sole rationale for judicial independence; judges must be
protected from all incursions, including those of other judges). The constitutionally pro-
tected independence of individual Article III judges is critical for at least two reasons.
First, it is essential for the proper performance of the judicial role. See O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1933) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall's well-known cele-
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Thus, although Article III's central elements include both a jurisdic-
tional field and a judicial office protected by the tenure and compensa-
tion provisions, it may be that only manipulation of the second neces-
sarily implicates the core functions of the federal judiciary.0 4 Never-
theless, Article III appears to frame both elements as rigid constitu-
tional imperatives. Since the early nineteenth century, friction between
these imperatives and growing federal adjudicative responsibilities has
engendered a tradition of pragmatic Article III construction.65 Al-
though a narrow constitutional reading might have restricted all cases
within Article III's jurisdictional field to federal courts staffed by
Article III judges, 0 the case law has long sanctioned an institutional
escape in the form of Article I tribunals authorized to hear specialized
classes of Article III cases. 67 Nevertheless, within courts created pur-
suant to Congress's Article III powers, precedent for the exercise of
decisionmaking authority by officials lacking the Article III guarantees
of office is relatively modest, 8 even though the use of such officials
results in a loss of Article III protection that is no more severe than that
which follows from the consignment of cases to Article I tribunals.
bration of judge "'rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to in-
fluence him but God and his conscience "); Kaufman, suPra note 60, at 714 (individualism
supported by judicial independence vital for "[t]hat personal element-that individual
sense of justice-[which] is not only inextinguishable, but essential for the orderly
development of law"). Second, the independence of individual judges is the mechanism
through which Article III safeguards the integrity of the judiciary as an institution. See
id. at 712-13.
64. Indeed, occasional congressional readjustment of federal court jurisdiction may be
necessary to ensure that the judiciary can continue to fulfill its core functions in a
satisfactory manner. See Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 515-16. See generally H. FRIENDLY,
supra note 51.
65. Discussing the approval of territorial courts staffed by nontenured judges in
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828), Justice Harlan observed:
It would have been doctrinaire in the extreme to deny the right of Congress to invest
judges of its creation with authority to dispose of the judicial business of the ter-
ritories. It would have been at least as dogmatic, having recognized the right, to
fasten on those judges a guarantee of tenure that Congress could not use and that
the exigencies of the territories did not require....
The same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result in Canter
has governed the decision in later cases sanctioning the creation of other courts with
judges of limited tenure.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546-47 (1962).
66. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3528,
at 125-26 (3d ed. 1975).
67. E.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261-62 (1969) (military tribunal court-
martial jurisdiction); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163, 168
(1943) (administrative adjudication of private federal right); see note 48 supra.
68. The bulk of premagistrate delegation case law centers on the use of special
masters. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (tightly restricting use
of special masters as trial officers); Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (discussing
courts' inherent power to use masters when necessary for discharge of duties). See gen-
erally note 76 infra.
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Glidden Co. v. Zdanok69 is the leading case illustrating judicial
sensitivity to the constitutional protections enjoyed by adjudicators
within the Article III courts. Glidden examined two challenges to
otherwise flawless decisions by adjudicators who appeared to be Article
I judges but who, with congressional authorization, sat on Article III
courts and heard cases falling within Article III's jurisdictional field.70
The sole issue in Glidden was the status of the these judges, who were
said to have exercised the decisionmaking power of the Article III
courts without enjoying the protections of office guaranteed by the
tenure and compensation provisions.7 1 A divided Supreme Court ul-
timately held that the Glidden judges were indeed Article III ap-
pointees, by determining that the forums to which they had originally
been appointed were established under Congress's Article III powers.
7 2
Yet Glidden implies that without such an Article III appointment, the
actions of the Glidden judges would have been invalid. 73
Glidden's concern about the Article III status of decisionmakers
within the federal courts is echoed by the magistrate case law, which
suggests that Article III bars magistrates from exercising case-dispositive
authority, at least without the consent of the litigants. 74 The chief
69. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
70. Glidden examined both the trial of a District of Columbia criminal case by a
Court of Claims judge and the participation of a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
judge in a circuit panel reviewing an appeal of a lower court diversity decision. Id. at
532 (plurality opinion).
71. Id. at 533.
72. See id. at 584 (rejecting precedents of Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929),
and Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933)) (disputed judges enjoyed tenure and
salary protections because their original appointments were to courts that had always been
Article III tribunals); 370 U.S. at 586-89 (Clark, J., concurring) (recent expression of Con-
gress's intent to grant courts Article III status had irrevocably established constitutional
tenure and compensation protection for their judges); id. at 592-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(judges remained officers of Article I courts and hence lacked constitutional protections of
Article III judicial office).
73. See 370 U.S. at 533 (plurality opinion) (although judges enjoyed statutory tenure
and denial of "independent judicial hearings" took place, Article III "is explicit and gives
the petitioners a basis for complaint without requiring them to point to particular in-
stances of mistreatment"); id. at 605 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (as Article I appointees,
judges could not serve on Article III courts because they lacked guarantees of tenure and
compensation); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 13 n.67 (1968); Note, supra note 21, at 702. But see Silberman, sutra note 19,
at 1304-05 (Glidden leaves open question of validity of exercise of federal judicial power
by non-Article III officers).
74. See, Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976) (dictum) (1968 Act meets Article
III concerns by ensuring that district judges retain ultimate decisionmaking responsibility);
Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 693 n.17 (2d Cir. 1978) (dictum) (advisory function
of magistrates generally relied on to meet Article III objections); Reciprocal Exch. v.
Noland, 542 F.2d 462, 463 (8th Cir. 1976) (Article III bars judges from delegating final
decisionmaking power); Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121, 123 (Ist Cir.
1972) (magistrate final determination of facts contrary to provisions of Article III). The
point at which magistrate authority over a case becomes sufficiently autonomous to
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examples75 of nontenured adjudicators within the Article III courts
are special masters, who are ad hoc appointees serving under "excep-
tional" conditions,76 and bankruptcy judges, who are specialists limited
to a single class of technical cases . 7 By contrast, administrative agencies
qualify as dispositive is still uncertain, see pp. 1043-44 infra, although recent case law
and the 1976 Amendments to the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976), may in-
dicate that the permissible level of authority comes very close to outright magistrate
adjudication, see p. 1044 infra (acceptance of magistrate evidentiary hearings on habeas
petitions); Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130, 1133 (2d Cir. 1977)
(dictum) (judges retain ultimate decisionmaking power despite master reference). Courts
have been more reluctant to authorize delegation within Article III courts, see Wedding
v. Wingo, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (statutory holding suggesting that magistrate recommended
disppsitfon of habeas claims is impermissibly risky), than they have been to authorize
jurisdictional transfer, see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (upholding exclusive
habeas jurisdiction of Article I District of Columbia courts). See generally p. 1044 infra
(magistrate evidentiary hearings now authorized by statute and generally accepted).
75. The United States Commissioner's consensual jurisdiction over petty criminal of-
fenses provides an additional, minor example of untenured adjudication within the Article
III courts. See note 26 supra.
76. The special master is an ad hoc court appointee who may preside over nonjury
civil hearings only under "exceptional" conditions. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). Traditionally, this
constraint was held to bar only systematic master reference of classes of cases, although
the courts have always been reluctant to delegate matters depending largely on the eval-
uation of oral testimony. See Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLuM.
L. REv. 452, 453 n.6, 455-59 (1958). See generally Note, supra note 48, at 789-96. In 1957,
however, the Supreme Court construed the exceptional-condition constraint narrowly,
holding that neither congested dockets nor the duration or complexity of an action will
suffice to justify master reference. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259
(1957).
It has frequently been argued that both the exceptional-condition constraint and the
La Buy decision were merely responses to the poor performance of many special masters,
who were usually private attorneys serving in a part-time capacity. See, e.g., Cruz v. Hauck,
515 F.2d 322, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1975); Silberman, supra note 19, at 1326-29; cf. Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (special master tradition establishes that judges need not
make all factual determinations in order to preserve "essential attributes of judicial
power"); CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 379-83 (2d Cir. 1975) (relaxation of
La Buy constraints justified for master reference to magistrate, in light of purpose of the
1968 Act, court congestion, nondispositive character of magistrate/master's duties, and
pre-La Buy case law). Yet the central concern of the La Buy opinion was the danger of
wholesale abdication of judicial trial responsibility, see 352 U.S. at 258-59a-concern with
distinct Article III overtones, see Note, supra note 21, at 706-07 (La Buy has implicit
Article III dimension); cf. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976) (magistrate review
of social security actions does not threaten "the important premises from which the La
Buy decision proceeded").
77. Currently, all voluntary bankruptcy petitions are referred to a bankruptcy judge
for a final disposition, which is subject to district court appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 66 (1976);
R. BANKR. P. 102(a). But the involuntary bankrupt retains the right to trial by jury before
the district judge, 11 U.S.C. § 42 (1976), while trustee suits against persons holding prop-
erty of the bankrupt are heard by the bankruptcy judge only on consent. Id. § 46(b). But
cf. note 12 supra (recent changes in authority of bankruptcy judges).
Although the bankruptcy judge presents a paradigm of routine intracourt delegation,
he, like the special master, see note 76 supra, provides a poor analogy to the magistrate
because of institutional differences. The narrow limits of bankruptcy jurisdiction confine
the risk of uncontrolled delegation. In addition, the bankruptcy judge's authority is
similar to the special master's "exceptional condition" writ large, for many of the bank-
ruptcy judge's unique powers were born in the crush of depression defaults and have
since developed as inertial solutions to subsequent increases in the bankruptcy caseload.
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and Article I courts are established and highly developed forms of
specialized adjudication outside the Article III system.
The institutional predominance of jurisdictional transfer over dele-
gation-of Article I tribunals over the models presented by the special
master and bankruptcy court-may reflect practical exigencies, 78 as
well as the differing constraints implied by the judicial-office and
jurisdictional-field provisions of Article III. But given the established
position of Article I forums, the significance attributed to Article III
judicial appointment in Glidden and the magistrate case law must
be based on something more than merely practical concerns. Judicial
reticence about delegation of decisionmaking power within the Article
III courts can be explained as an effort to preserve any but the most
attenuated protective content for the policies underlying the tenure
and salary provisions."0 Without delegation limits, the protection af-
See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8-9 (1977) (report on bankruptcy law revision).
Since bankruptcy matters have long dwarfed other federal cases in sheer number, their
return to the district judges is now inconceivable. Id. at 20-21.
78. As a solution to problems raised by a rigid interpretation of Article III, jurisdic-
tional transfer to novel forums is, in most instances, inherently more flexible than delega-
tion within Article III tribunals. For some problems, an Article I forum may be the only
plausible solution. See note 65 supra (Glidden's analysis of early territorial courts);
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969) (dictum) (military law necessary for military
discipline). In other instances, transfer to an Article I forum offers liberation from the
cumbersome procedural and structural constraints attending Article III adjudication. Cf.
H. FRIENDLY, supra note 51, at 64-68 (advantages of flexibility, expertise, and uniform
adjudication accruing from administrative agency fact-finding in appropriate cases). As
an answer to the chronic problem of overcrowded Article III courts, delegation and
jurisdictional transfer (to state courts or, when Congress's Article I powers permit, to
Article I tribunals) may serve as functional equivalents. Cf. 1977 House Hearings, suPra
note 4, at 216 (Judge Friendly) (elimination of federal diversity jurisdiction may affect
need for magistrate trials). The problems for which delegation serves as the most con-
venient answer are perceived structural inadequacies or inefficiencies in the federal courts
themselves. See note 76 supra (special master appointment permitted under exceptional
circumstances); H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 12, 22 (magistrate trials meet need for
greater district court flexibility and novel form of speedy, informal district court adju-
dication). But see note 181 infra (widespread magistrate trials, unlike master reference,
respond to structural inadequacies that are open to alternative solutions).
79. See p. 1033 supra (policies underlying tenure and salary provisions). One might
reject a broad reading of the policies underlying the tenure and salary provisions in
favor of a minimalist view that these guarantees seek only to protect the judiciary from
incursions by the other branches. See Silberman, supra note 19, at 1316-18; cf. R. BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 154 (1973) (Framers' remarks on judicial
independence refer exclusively to freedom from executive and legislative encroachments).
Such a minimalist position would seem to permit unrestrained delegation within the
Article III courts as long as the Article III judiciary were able to shield litigants from
outside meddling through judicial control of the delegation process. See Silberman, supra
note 19, at 1317 (Article III requirement of judicial independence preserved by magistrate
decisionnaking when Article III judges retain power to review decisions, appoint magis-
trates, and regulate magistrate jurisdiction); cf. H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 10-11
(three elements providing constitutional basis for 1979 Act are litigant consent, judicial
review, and magistrate's position within district court).
The minimalist reduction of the tenure and compensation provisions into a proxy for
separation-of-powers concerns is, however, unpersuasive. It is the larger aggregate of pro-
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forded by those provisions would be vitiated, not only in cases assigned
to Article I forums, but also in cases remaining in the Article III courts.
The result would be an incongruous broader system of Article I and
Article III forums: a system that relied on Congress's Article III power
to support its centerpiece, the district courts, but which also denied
any secure foothold to the institutional protection that Article III
courts were designed to provide.8 0
In addition to requiring at least some delegation constraints, how-
ever, Article III's protective policies also favor jurisdictional transfer
over delegation in three key respects. First, the range of cases losing
the protection of a hearing before an Article III judge as the result of
a jurisdictional transfer to an Article I tribunal is necessarily localized
by the terms of the statute involved. By contrast, a permissive delega-
tion policy loosens the judiciary's grip on its whole jurisdiction and
thus raises the specter of a comprehensive denial of trial before an
Article III judge to all litigants.8' Second, transfer leaves Article III's
tections accompanying a protected judicial office, including protections for litigants and
for the institution of the judiciary itself, see p. 1033 supra, and not merely insulation
from interbranch meddling, that is safeguarded by a hearing before an Article III judge.
Thus, it cannot be argued that the tenure and salary provisions are interchangeable with
more attenuated controls that focus on the institution of the judiciary rather than in-
dividual adjudicators. In addition, the minimalist view cannot account for case law sug-
gesting that, absent litigant consent, Article III bars magistrates from exercising ultimate
decisionmaking power. See note 74 supra (citing cases). Note that an analogous controversy
over the scope of Article III's policy of judicial independence characterizes the debate
about whether judges may be removed through a judicial review procedure that bypasses
the impeachment process. Compare Kaufman, supra note 60, at 712-13 (principle of
judicial independence extends beyond separation-of-powers concerns) with S. REP. No.
1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978) (judicial independence has "historically referred, not
to the independence of judges from one another, but rather to the independence of the
judiciary as an institution from other branches of government").
80. See pp. 1032-33 supra (contribution of tenure and salary provisions to special func-
tions of Article III courts); cf. H.R. RP. 1364, supra note 1, at 38 (dissenting views of
Reps. Drinan and Kindness) (logic of consensual reference permits Congress to replace
inferior federal courts with greatly expanded magistrate system). Of course, wholesale
jurisdictional transfer would also deny a secure foothold for Article III protections. See
note 48 supra. Wholesale jurisdictional transfer is, however, hardly a threat today. In
addition, the text of Article III lends itself more easily to transfer than to delegation.
When Congress authorizes transfer, it merely overlooks Article III, § 2, in favor of a
specific Article I power. When Congress authorizes delegation, it makes use of Article III
power without regard for the restrictions imposed by Article III's judicial office. Indeed,
a permissive delegation policy allows the paradoxical result that Congress may employ
its Article III power to deprive federal litigants of an Article III judge in cases in which
it could not use its Article I powers to achieve the same result. For example, diversity
cases might be delegated, although Congress would seem to lack power to authorize
Article I adjudication of cases falling within most of the party-based heads of federal
jurisdiction sketched by Article III, § 2. See note 47 supra (quoting text of Article III,
§ 2); cf. Note, suPra note 48, at 787 (arguing from conservative view of Congress's power to
transfer jurisdiction that delegation should be similarly limited).
81. Cf. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957) (without tight con-
straints, court congestion threatens to make master reference the rule); pp. 1049-50 infra
(expansionist potential of magistrate system).
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allocation of functions between Congress and the judiciary undisturbed
because it preserves control over jurisdictional allocation firmly in
congressional hands. Widespread delegation, on the other hand, raises
parallel questions about the extent to which Congress may relinquish-
and the extent to which the judiciary may perform-a task that lies at
the core of jurisdictional allocation: the prescribing of policies that
determine the distribution of Article III judges among litigants.82
82. By disengaging adjudication before Article III judges from the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Article III courts, widespread delegation splits a previously unitary
sphere of congressional authority into two components: the initial decision to allocate
jurisdiction (which remains in congressional hands), and the subsequent, iterative decision
to channel cases to Article III judges or nontenured adjudicators. Traditional doctrines
of subject-matter jurisdiction appear to attach only to the first of these components. See
Silberman, supra note 19, at 1350-51. Yet because the Article III judiciary is the constitu-
tive feature of the Article III courts, the iterative delegation decision retains a strong
quasi-jurisdictional character, which may account for its frequent analysis in jurisdictional
terms. See De Costa v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 503-05 (lst Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976), discussed in note 132 infra; H.R. REP. 1364,
suPra note 1, at 38 (dissenting views of Reps. Drinan and Kindness). The history of the
1979 Act also demonstrates the quasi-jurisdictional character of delegation decisionmaking
by revealing the controversial policy implications of singling out particular classes of
cases for magistrate adjudication. See pp. 1052-53 infra; cf. note 175 infra (hypothetical
illustrating role of-olicy choice in delegation decisions).
The significance of the quasi-jurisdictional nature of delegation decisionmaking stems
from separation-of-powers concerns, since widespread delegation entails a major shift in
hitherto jurisdictional authority from Congress to the courts. To be sure, Congress may
assign a wide range of policymaking powers to the other branches. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN,
REFoR OF COURT RuLE-MAKING PaOCEDURES 89-96 (1977) (separation of powers permits
delegation of rulemaking authority to Supreme Court and Judicial Conference). Neverthe-
less, Congress may not ignore the basic functional divisions among the branches of the
federal government. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-43 (1976) (exercise of executive
and judicial functions by Federal Election Commission staffed by congressional appointees
is barred by separation-of-powers concerns and appointments clause). Unlike the usual
legislative delegation of policymaking authority, assignment to the judiciary of control
over the allocation of Article III judges is a transfer of authority over a central structural
feature of the judiciary itself. As an incident of Congress's power to establish the inferior
courts, this authority belongs to the system of specific constitutional checks that divide
responsibility for supervising organizational change within one branch of the federal
government between the other two branches. Cf. id. at 124-37 (role of appointments
clause in maintaining separation of powers); Kaufman, supra note 60, at 712 (Judicial
Conference expresses reservations about constitutionality of congressional delegation to
judiciary of removal power over judges). Whether judicial control over jurisdictional
choices raises a constitutional problem may hinge on the scope of judicial authority over
delegation policy. Clearly, Congress might retain the whole of its jurisdictional power by
promulgating detailed statutory guidelines to govern delegation decisions. Alternatively,
resort to the federal rulemaking machinery on the national level would preserve an
element of congressional participation in formulating delegation policy. But the 1979 Act
would eschew any congressional participation; instead, it would limit district court discre-
tion over delegation policy only by providing the consensual-reference mechanism and,
in the case of the 1979 House bill, by proscribing wholesale judicial delineation of ref-
erence targets through local court rules. See pp. 1052-53 infra (requirement of reference
on case-by-case basis). Individualized reference limits the reach and formality of judicial
reference decisions. The consensual-reference technique implies that Congress's transfer
of quasi-jurisdictional authority is in part an assignment to the litigants themselves, and
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Finally, transfer on a moderate scale does not jeopardize the Article
III policy of safeguarding an independent, respected and capable in-
stitution of federal courts. Widespread delegation, however, introduces
a novel dimension of Article III risk by opening the courts to the un-
certain longrun consequences of routine adjudication by untenured
officials.
83
It is true that the constraints implied by each of Article III's ele-
ments-a jurisdictional field and a tightly insulated judicial office-
have been relaxed in the past in order to permit both Article I forums
and, under some circumstances, the delegation of judicial power within
Article III tribunals. Yet, as Glidden suggests, courts are reluctant to
authorize officials other than Article III judges to exercise the decision-
making power of the Article III courts. For the most part, Article III
has proven more receptive to the resolution of practical difficulties ac-
companying federal adjudication through jurisdictional transfer than
through delegation 8 4 Moreover, a compelling rationale for this dif-
ference emerges from the disparate riskiness of transfer and delegation
for the judiciary's grip on its entire jurisdiction, for the traditional
allocation of functions between Congress and the courts, and for the
longrun institutional development of the courts.
II. Article III and Particular Modes of Magistrate Reference
The intimate relationship between constraints on the delegation of
judicial power within Article III courts and the protective function of
the Article III judicial office requires close constitutional scrutiny of
any large-scale program of internal delegation. The following discussion
examines two modes of delegation to magistrates, recommended dis-
position and consensual reference, in light of the critical significance
of delegation constraints. In both instances, the analysis probes risks to
Article III delegation policy that accompany widely accepted magis-
trate procedures.
is, therefore, less vulnerable to separation-of-powers criticism. Yet, both consensual ref-
erence and individualized reference decisions may cease to be effective limitations of
district court discretion if delegation became a routine practice. See pp. 1050-51 infra
(consensual reference); p. 1055 infra (individualized reference).
83. See pp. 1050-57 infra (institutional risks attending widespread delegation to magis.
trates). Traditional congressional authority to allocate jurisdiction between state and
federal courts suggests non-Article III tribunals as a familiar solution to Article III
rigidity. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (dictum); cf. 3 ELLIOT DEBATES,
supra note 55, at 517, 547 (Pendleton at Virginia Deliberations) (Congress's power to vest
Article III jurisdiction in state courts provides necessary flexibility).
84. Of course, jurisdictional transfer and delegation do not present equally viable
solutions to the same range of problems. See note 78 supra.
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A. Habeas Corpus Evidentiary Hearings and the Limits of
Recommended Disposition
As codified in the 1976 Amendments to the Magistrates Act, 85 the
recommended-disposition procedure" is generally believed to satisfy
Article III delegation constraints because it both preserves the judi-
ciary's untrammelled power to modify magistrate recommendations and
retains for the parties the right to invoke judicial scrutiny.87 Analysis of
the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Wingo v. Wedding8 suggests,
however, that magistrate evidentiary hearings and subsequent recom-
mended disposition of habeas corpus petitions may present constitu-
tional problems that remain unsolved.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Wedding presented two ra-
tionales for barring such a procedure for handling habeas petitions
that reach the evidentiary stage. The Court's formal holding was that
both the Federal Habeas Corpus Statute 9 and the 1968 Magistrates
Act9° restrict habeas evidentiary hearings to district judges.91 Yet, as
Chief Justice Burger's dissent demonstrated,92 these conclusions were at
best arguable. Following the Sixth Circuit's reasoning below,93 the
Court's interpretation of the habeas corpus statute rested on a 1941
decision, Holiday v. Johnston,94 that had itself resorted to a narrow
statutory construction in order to bar habeas evidentiary hearings by
United States Commissioners.9, Yet, unless Holiday was read to hint at
85. Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976)).
86. See pp. 1028-29 suPra.
87. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1283 before the Subcomm. on Improvement in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975) (Judicial
Conference report on 1976 Amendments) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings]; H.R.
REP. 1609, supra note 32, at 7; Silberman, supra note 19, at 1334-38.
88. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
90. Id. § 636(b) (1970) (amended 1976).
91. 418 U.S. at 472.
92. Id. at 487, quoted in S. REP. No. 625, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) ("the Court has
construed the Magistrates Act contrary to a clear legislative intent") [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. 625].
93. Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (6th Cir. 1973), affd, 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
94. 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
95. Holiday construed the phrase "court, or justice, or judge" in the then-current
Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 461 (1940), to mean "judge" for the purpose of prohibiting
habeas hearings conducted by commissioners. 313 U.S. at 352. Later modifications in
statutory language abbreviated this phrase to "court." See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S.
461, 468 (1974). The Wedding majority argued that "court" continued to mean "judge"
for purposes of restricting magistrates as well as commissioners. See id. at 468-69. But see
id. at 477-80 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (equally technical statutory analysis); Note, United
States Magistrates: Additional Duties in Civil Proceedings, 27 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 542,
548-49 n.48 (1977).
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constitutional concems,9 6 it was controlling in the magistrate context
only if, as Wedding asserted,9 7 Congress also intended to bar magistrate
evidentiary hearings in the 1968 Act.98 But the 1968 Act neither pro-
hibited nor approved such hearings. Instead it contained a sweeping
provision sanctioning magistrate assignment of all duties "not incon-
sistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States," 99 coupled
with an illustration in the habeas area that stopped short of condoning
magistrate evidentiary hearings. 0 0 Moreover, the Act's legislative his-
tory suggested only that Congress wished to avoid an explicit recom-
mendation that the courts might find constitutionally risky,' 0 ' not that
96. The Sixth Circuit had suggested such a reading. See Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (quoting Payne v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1192
(6th Cir. 1971) ("'[a]ssuming, without deciding that Congress could have constitutionally
changed the result of Holiday .... it is evident that Congress chose not to do so' "). But
see Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 1973) (suggesting that Sixth Circuit's
Wedding opinion read Holiday as possessing constitutional overtones) ("we do not read
Holiday v. Johnston ... as holding that the Constitution prohibits magistrates from con-
ducting evidentiary hearings") (citation omitted). Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit made its
own constitutional reservations explicit. See Ellis v. Buchkoe, 491 F.2d 716, 717 (6th Cir.
1974).
97. 418 U.S. at 470 (both text and legislative history of 1968 Act "plainly reveal a
congressional determination to retain the requirement" of judge conducting habeas
evidentiary hearings). Yet the applicability of the requirement to magistrates was estab-
lished only after Wedding's statutory exegesis. See note 104 infra (citing cases).
98. But see Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 321, 364-66 (1973) (Holiday bars reading 1968 Act to permit magistrate evidentiary
hearings).
Holiday also played a broader role in the Wedding opinion. Holiday's dicta supported
Wedding's assertion of a risk of de facto magistrate adjudication following habeas hear-
ings, see p. 1043 infra, and Holiday's analogy between commissioner evidentiary hearings
and special master functions, 313 U.S. at 351-53, may have influenced Wedding's out-
come, see note 113 infra.
99. See 1968 Act, § 636(b).
100. Id. § 636(b)(3). Referring to the list of items that included § 636(b)(3), the Senate
and House reports stressed that it was intended to "illustrate the general character of
duties assignable to magistrates under the Act, rather than to constitute exclusive specifica-
tion of duties so assignable." H.R. REP. 1629, supra note 26, at 19; accord, S. REP. 371,
supra note 26, at 25.
101. The original draft of the 1968 Act contained a broad provision governing magis-
trate postconviction relief authority, which "was susceptible of the interpretation that
magistrates might conduct evidentiary hearings." Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 471
(1974) (citing S. 3475, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)). That provision, together with the
entire subsection 636(b), was withdrawn at the urging of the Judicial Conference. See 418
U.S. at 484 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As Chief Justice Burger suggested, the final language
of § 636(b)-a broad permissive clause and a conservative set of illustrations-reflected the
drafters' desire to avoid the appearance of recommending a procedure that might entail
an impermissible delegation of judicial power. Id. at 484-85. S. REP. 371, supra note 26,
signals this conclusion as well. After noting that law clerks performed the specific func-
tion of reviewing and reporting on prisoner petitions authorized by § 636(b)(3), id. at 26,
it concluded a discussion of the magistrate's powers by encouraging district judges to
experiment with the assignment of magistrates to other functions, subject only to the
constraints of Article III, id. at 26-27. The remarks of Senator Tydings, sponsor of the
1968 Act, indicate that he believed that magistrate hearings on prisoner petitions would
not violate Article III by delegating ultimate decisionmaking power. See 1966-67 Senate
Hearings, supra note 26, at 111-13.
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it desired to withhold a procedure deemed useful and permissible by
the courts.102 The extent to which the Wedding majority seemed to
misread 10 3 Congress's intent can be gauged by the drift of circuit court
opinion'0 4 prior to Wedding, as well as by Congress's prompt rejection
of the Wedding result in the 1976 Amendments. 0 5
In addition to its statutory analysis, however, the Wedding majority
offered a second, supporting rationale for its decision: magistrate
habeas hearings inevitably result in the risk of de facto magistrate ad-
judication, since the small percentage of habeas petitions surviving to
the evidentiary hearing stage' 0 6 turn largely on factual determina-
tions that are highly dependent on evaluations of witness credibility. 107
In the Court's view, even safeguards such as the judicial review of
recorded testimony 08 may be unable to ensure that habeas petitions
turning on evidentiary hearings will always receive the benefit of
judicial, rather than magistrate determination. 0 9
Although the Wedding majority mustered solid support for its find-
ing of possible de facto magistrate adjudication,"10 Wedding pointedly
left open the question of whether Article III prohibited Congress from
authorizing magistrate habeas hearings."' Nevertheless, unarticulated
reservations based on Article III provide a cogent explanation for
Wedding's holding.1 12 Wedding's strained statutory construction points
102. See S. REP. 371, supra note 26, at 25-27.
103. But see note 114 infra (Wedding correctly read Congress's intent insofar as it
rests on Article III reservations).
104. Two circuits had concluded prior to Wedding that magistrates were authorized
to conduct habeas hearings. See O'Shea v. United States, 491 F.2d 774, 778 (Ist Cir. 1974);
Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 1973). Two other circuits assumed that
such authorization existed. See United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Zelker, 477 F.2d 797 (2d
Cir. 1973); Parnell v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1972).
105. See note 92 sup~ra.
106. In 1973, the year prior to Wedding, 530 of the 10,800 habeas petitions warranted
evidentiary hearings. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 473 n.20 (1974).
107. Id. at 468, 474 (citing Holiday v. Johnson, 313 U.S. 342, 352 (1941)).
108. The Wedding district court had offered petitioners de novo judicial review of
recorded testimony by local court rule. See id. at 465-66.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 468, 474. Wedding may also have tacitly relied on a 1973 empirical study
of habeas petitions in Massachusetts. The study suggested that magistrate evidentiary
hearings often resulted in de facto magistrate adjudication and was critical of magistrate
performance. See Shapiro, supra note 98, at 362, 366. Some of the Massachusetts hear-
ings were conducted without an opportunity for petitioner appeal of magistrate recom-
mendations to the deciding judge. Id. at 362. Appeal rights were afforded to the Wedding
petitioner, see 418 U.S. at 464, and are included in the 1976 Amendments, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(2) (1976).
111. 418 U.S. at 467 n.4 (quoting Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131, 1133 n.l (6th Cir.
1973)) (indicating no views "on Congress's power to authorize habeas hearings by officers
'outside the pale of Article III' ").
112. See Comment, Annulment of the Wedding Decision: Statutory Revision to Extend
Use of Federal Magistrates in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 16 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 341,
352-54 (1974) (Wedding's reliance on Holiday and centrality of habeas fact-finding in-
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toward such reservations," 3 and, paradoxically, the Wedding dissent
also hints at majority doubts through its assertion that the disputed
habeas hearings satisfy constitutional constraints because "ultimate
decisionmaking authority" remains in judicial hands." 4 Unless deci-
sionmaking authority is understood to encompass only the formal power
to modify magistrate recommendations, one strand of the Wedding
majority's argument is precisely that decisionmaking authority may slip
from judicial hands in the course of magistrate habeas hearings." 5
Despite these considerations, however, Wedding's possible constitu-
tional reservations were ignored by the drafters of the 1976 Amend-
ments in favor of the dissent's Article III analysis. 16
timates that prisoners have constitutional right to testify before Article III judge). But see
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976) (characterizing Wedding as habeas corpus
statutory holding).
113. In particular, Wedding's reliance on the Holiday-based statutory construction of
the Sixth Circuit, see pp. 1041-42 supra, suggests Article III reservations, since the Sixth
Circuit made its own constitutional doubts explicit well before the Court's Wedding
opinion. See Ellis v. Buchkoe, 491 F.2d 716, 717 (6th Cir. 1974). Wedding's reliance on
Holiday, see note 95 suPra, suggests that an analogy between magistrate habeas hearings
and special master appointments also influenced Wedding's outcome. See id.; Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 482 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 87, at 34 & n.2. However, the influence that the master analogy may have exerted on
Wedding melds with deeper Article III concerns. No authoritative legislative materials
accompanying the 1968 Act tied master appointments to habeas hearings, and moreover,
the Wedding hearing itself did not formally resemble a master appointment. Therefore,
as developments in the Sixth Circuit suggest, see note 96 supra, constitutional reservations
may have motivated the court's introduction of Holiday and the master analogy into the
context of magistrate habeas hearings.
114. 418 U.S. at 486-87 n.11. The dissent also observed that the majority opinion did
not suggest a constitutional barrier to magistrate habeas hearings. Id. at 481 n.6 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). A second paradox underlying Wedding is that if, as suggested, the
majority doubted the constitutional status of magistrate habeas hearings, they could have
relied on Congress's own doubts and consequent avoidance of the issue to support a
straightforward statutory interpretation rejecting such hearings. See note 101 supra
(1968 Act sought to avoid impermissible delegation of decisionmaking power). Yet ruling
openly on this ground would have forced the majority to be explicit about its own con-
stitutional reservations. Thus Wedding remains true to the 1968 Act's legislative intent
insofar as Wedding itself is a vehicle for constitutional reservations. Wedding's strained
statutory construction may be the only middle path between avoiding a difficult con-
stitutional ruling and accepting the task that the 1968 Act thrust on the courts-namely,
marking the constitutional limits on magistrate authority.
115. 418 U.S. at 474 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958)) (" 'it is
commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit . . . depends more often on how the fact-
finder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a state or interpretation of
a line of precedents' ").
116. See S. REP. 625, supra note 92, at 3-4; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 87, at 1-41
(failing to mention possibility of Wedding Article III reservations). Post-1974 developments
have eviscerated Wedding without resolving the doubts that it raises. The 1976 Amend-
ments, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976), drafted largely by the Judicial Conference, might be
viewed as a collective per curiam reversal of Wedding. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 87, at 33-38 (Judicial Conference report on Proposed Amendment to the Federal
Magistrates Act). In addition, challenges to magistrate hearings since the Amendments
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A second recent opinion, Swain v. Pressley,117 eliminated the pos-
sibility that Wedding's constitutional reservations might be traced to
the unique constitutional status of habeas corpus rather than to the
delegation problem itself."" Pressley upheld a gTant of exclusive habeas
jurisdiction to the Article I District of Columbia courts by ruling that
the Constitution's suspension clause" 9 does not mandate a hearing
before an Article III judge when habeas procedures are otherwise
adequate and effective. 20 Thus, the doubts accompanying Wedding's
finding of a risk of de facto magistrate adjudication may continue to
haunt not only habeas hearings, but also other potentially dispositive
magistrate recommendations' 2 ' that turn on evaluation of contradic-
have fared poorly in the circuits. See, e.g., Rees v. United States Dist. Court, 572 F.2d 700
(9th Cir. 1978), discussed at note 130 infra; White v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1977);
cf. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 8(b) (ef-
fective Feb. 1, 1977) (incorporating 1976 Amendments' provision for magistrate habeas
hearings).
The only recent Supreme Court decision to address recommended disposition, Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (Burger, C.J.), unanimously approved magistrate hearings of
social security review actions-a task entailing none of the dangers isolated by Wedding,
since social security hearings focus on a closed administrative record that is equally ac-
cessible to magistrate and judge, id. at 270 n.6. Weber took care to stress the nonevidentiary
character of social security hearings, id. at 270, but nevertheless distinguished Wedding
as a habeas corpus statutory holding, id. at 275, and rejected the assertion that judges
would accept magistrate recommendations automatically, id. at 273-74. Weber also reiter-
ated the significance of final judicial decisionmaking as a bulwark against impermissible
delegation. Id. at 270. But the meaning of final decisionmaking now seems frozen in the
mold cast by the Wedding dissent. See p. 1044 supra (Wedding dissent); Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81 n.22 (1977) (citing Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 473-74
(1974)) (newly promulgated habeas corpus rules authorize magistrate performance "of
virtually all the duties of a district judge, except for the exercise of ultimate decision-
making authority").
117. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
118. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468 (1974) (discussing constitutional signif-
icance of habeas corpus).
119. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.")
120. 430 U.S. at 882-84 (relying on Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)).
Pressley observed that a statutory clause permitting Article III jurisdiction upon a show-
ing that local court relief was "inadequate or ineffective" obviated constitutional reserva-
tions. 430 U.S. at 381. A footnote implied that judicial tenure might be relevant to a show-
ing of inadequacy in rare circumstances. Id. at 383 n.20. Since Pressley's presumption of
local judge competency to decide habeas constitutional issues rests on the local District of
Columbia judge's authority to try the underlying criminal charges, see id. at 382-83, a
similar presumption would not extend to magistrates. Unlike District of Columbia judges,
who are comparable in status to state court judges, magistrates are subordinate officers of
the federal district court who may try minor offenses only on a consensual basis. See note
21 supra.
121. The prime matters affected are evidentiary hearings on other kinds of prisoner
petitions. See note 125 infra (prisoner civil rights petitions); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976)
(all hearings on prisoner petitions may be referred to magistrates).
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tory oral testimony. 122 To be sure, in the wake of the 1976 Amend-
ments these reservations alone will no longer support a challenge to
what are now established district court procedures. 12 3 Yet the accep-
tance achieved by magistrate habeas hearings may reveal less about the
risks that they entail than about the countervailing pressures on over-
crowded courts that have rendered those risks acceptable.124
Beyond the doubts raised by Wedding, however, one characteristic
that habeas petitions share with prisoner civil rights petitions12 5 makes
them especially poor subjects for experiments conducted on the edges
of Article III: for the most part, they are brought by state prisoners
requesting a federal court to set aside a state court verdict, often on
grounds already rejected by a state's highest tribunal. 26 Prior to
Wedding, it was suggested that under these circumstances less confident
magistrates may sometimes be reluctant to grant relief even when it is
warranted. 27 Yet a more pressing constitutional argument against
magistrate evidentiary hearings rests on comity and federalism prin-
ciples. The resentment already felt by state court judges at being over-
turned by a district court may be heightened by the suspicion that the
122. Wedding's exclusive focus on habeas corpus also leaves open the possibility that
its reservations extended solely to the delegation of habeas hearings within Article III
courts. This alternative reading would follow a fortiori from a view that all restrictions on
special master appointments rest on nonconstitutional considerations. See note 76 supra
(special master restrictions).
123. See note 116 supra (citing cases).
124. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 475-76 & n.3 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(purpose of 1968 Act to provide time for district judges, and habeas applications are heavy
burden on courts); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 87, at 36 (Judicial Conference report
on proposed amendment) (volume, complexity, and uneven distribution of prisoner peti-
tions seriously burden federal courts). Acceptance of magistrate habeas hearings also
evidences growing judicial confidence in magistrate competency. See id. at 35 (high level
of magistrate performance will hold down appeals from magistrate recommendations).
From the standpoint of Wedding's concerns, however, such confidence is a two-edged
sword.
125. Prisoner petitions allege constitutional deprivations in conditions of confinement.
Most state-prisoner civil rights actions are filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (action for
deprivation of constitutional rights "under color of state law").
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) (state habeas petitioners must exhaust state
remedies).
127. One commentator noted:
[W]hatever resentment may be felt in the state courts at having the Supreme Judicial
Court overturned by a district judge must be heightened if the overturning is, in
substance, at the hands of a magistrate-an attitude to which the magistrates are
probably sensitive and which is likely to make them somewhat reluctant to grant
relief to a petitioner even when circumstances require.
Shapiro, supra note 98, at 366-67. This concern is met in part by the 1976 Amendments' de
novo review procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976). Analogous concern today might
focus on magistrate recommendations in highly ambiguous or innovative actions. Cf. pp.




reversal was in practice the work of a magistrate, 12  and de facto
magistrate adjudication also triggers concern about impermissible forms
of federal intervention in the state judiciary. 12 A 1978 challenge by the
State of California to magistrate habeas hearings demonstrates that the
federalism and comity issues remain live concerns. 130 Thus the sensitive
position of prisoner petitions at a key pressure point in state-federal
relations adds urgency to the risks that accompany the expansion of the
magistrate's role as a judicial adviser to include authority to conduct
prisoner evidentiary hearings.
B. The Limits of Consensual Reference
Like recommended disposition, consensual reference is now widely
believed to be constitutionally permissible.' 3 ' The case law has not yet
fully explained why consent justifies a relaxed delegation policy,' 32 but
128. See note 127 supra.
129. See note 130 infra; Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article
III and a Problem of Statutory Interpretation, 60 IowA L. REv. 937, 939-40 (1975). The
Supreme Court has recently demonstrated growing concern for comity and federalism
considerations governing federal court intervention in state court matters. See Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
130. See Rees v. Unitdd States Dist. Court, 572 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1978). Rees ruled on
two state requests for a writ of mandamus barring magistrate habeas hearings authorized
by the 1976 Amendments. The state argued, inter alia, that judicial hearings were required
by considerations of federalism and comity. Id. at 702. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
the importance of the state's claim, but refused the requested writs, in part because it did
not view the district court rule authorizing magistrate hearings as clearly erroneous. Id.
at 702-03. But cf. Orand v. United States, 589 F.2d 472, 473 (9th Cir. 1979) (without
discussing Rees, indicating that magistrates may conduct all post-conviction evidentiary
hearings).
131. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 10-11.
132. See DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (Ist Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). DeCosta is the leading authority on the constitutional validity
of consensual reference. Nonetheless, DeCosta erroneously analyzed consensual reference as
though it presented a litigant the choice between two tribunals with overlapping jurisdic-
tion, rather than between two adjudicators from the same tribunal. The magistrate is
alternately portrayed as an Article I officer, id. at 503 n.3, and analogized to an arbitrator,
id. at 505. This framework intentionally excludes the issue of Article III limits on
delegation:
[Q]uite different policy and precedent should apply where the parties to a civil
dispute themselves select another forum. Under such circumstances, it is inappro-
priate to evaluate the problem as one of the right of the judiciary to relinquish its
authority. The issue is not the power of the judge to refer, but the power of the
parties to agree to another arbiter, absent overriding constitutional considerations.
Id. at 504 (footnote omitted). However, the magistrate is not an Article I judge, but an
officer who adjudicates on behalf of an Article III court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 268 (1976); Gallagher, supra note 33, at 76 n.53 (DeCosta's error). Under present forms
of consensual reference, judges retain the power to initiate references while the parties are
restricted to a veto right. See note 43 supra (consensual master appointment); 1979 Act
§ 2(2). Difficult though the issue of delegation within Article III courts is, it seems
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the reason must lie in waiver's ability to mitigate the concerns that
underlie restrictions on the delegation of judicial power. Consent
partially safeguards the individual's interest in neutral and expert ad-
judication 33 and it seems to preserve his right to receive, and the
judicial duty to provide, a trial before a tenured adjudicator. 34 At the
same time, it relieves judges of part of the onus of engaging in a "juris-
dictional" balancing of values prior to reference. 13  Nevertheless, the
recent reluctance of circuit courts to sanction complete withdrawal by
judges from magistrate trials13 6 suggests that litigant consent may be
an incomplete answer to Article III delegation concerns. The longrun
risk of mass consensual reference introduced by the 1979 Act, coupled
with the magistrate system's past record of rapid development, is deeply
troubling.
The magistrate system differs from older solutions to court over-
crowding in its unique flexibility and political convenience. The Judi-
cial Conference is empowered to authorize new magistrate positions on
the basis of need and with none of the jostling, visibility, and political
oversight that attend the creation of additional judgeships. 3 7 On the
district level, consensual reference offers the lure of manageable dock-
ets painlessly achieved through the multiplication of magistrates, ref-
erences, or both. Furthermore, magistrate expansion has no natural
far more tractable than the issues raised by DeCosta's Article I analysis, which ultimately
implies that Congress has tacitly vested the entire Article III civil jurisdiction in a parallel
system of Article I forums. Nevertheless, the DeCosta impulse to analyze consensual
reference in jurisdictional rather than delegation terms is instructive. See pp. 1038-39
supra (Article III preference for transfer).
133. See note 184 inIra. Consent may act as a market control. When litigants suspect
lack of magistrate competence or neutrality, they may reserve a judge by paying higher
waiting costs.
134. But see p. 1050 infra (as courts plan on magistrates to meet rising caseloads,
growing portion of jurisdiction loses right to tenured judge).
135. See DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 504 (Ist Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976), discussed in note 132 supra.
136. See, e.g., Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978) (magistrate jury trial
remanded for district judge review and entry of final judgment); Reciprocal Exch. v.
Noland, 542 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming magistrate judgment after remand on
Article III grounds for treatment as recommended disposition). The Sick holding was
based on ambiguity in the original magistrate reference order and on FED. R. Civ. P. 58
(governing entry of final court orders), but Sick also cited possible Article III infirmities
attending magistrate final judgment. Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 693 & n.17 (2d
Cir. 1978) (dictum). Other circuits have rejected appeals from magistrate final judgments
on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (granting appellate jurisdiction over district court
judgments). See, e.g., Carmena v. Operating Eng'rs Local 406, 572 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Reeds, 552 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1977).
137. See note 28 supra; cf. S. REP. No. 344, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (bypass of
Congress among administrative advantages of magistrate system) [hereinafter cited as S.




antagonists among interest groups.13s Unlike additional judgeships, it
does not dilute the status of the judicial appointment; 39 it merely
lightens the judiciary's workload. Unlike jurisdictional cutbacks, it
neither offends particular classes of litigants on its face, nor forces hard
decisions about the judiciary's priorities. 40 Finally, a new magistrate
post costs only half as much as a new judgeship,' 4' a consideration that
greatly enhances the magistrate's relative political attractiveness. 142
These factors, as well as the rising federal caseload, suggest that the
magistrate system is susceptible to an inherent expansionist dynamic
and that longrun pressures toward mass consensual reference may be too
intense for many district courts to resist. Although it has been argued
that the system will find its natural limits when an equilibrium is
reached between the capacities of equally busy magistrates and
judges,143 this view overlooks the attractions of adding additional
magistrates to cope with overall pressures on district court caseloads.14 4
138. Cf. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 511 (ABA House of Delegates report)
("the most notable feature of the magistrate system is the absence of any criticism of its
use").
139. See H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 21 (judiciary cannot be expanded indefinitely
without threatening high quality of persons seeking judgeships); H. FRIENDLY, supra note
51, at 29-30 (prestige of judgeships declines with increase in judiciary's size).
140. See generally 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4 (1979 Act and curtailment of
diversity jurisdiction considered simultaneously).
141. Id. at 498-501.
142. See id. at 170 (Judge Metzner) (because of cost considerations, "Congress says 'use
magistrates'" when asked for more judges and courthouses); S.D.N.Y. Magistrate System,
suPra note 17, at 41-42.
143. See Silberman, supra note 19, at 1360; cf. Comment, supra note 39, at 595 n.71
(as magistrates will be perceived as inferior to judges, absolute demand for magistrates
will be less than for judges).
144. One report has recommended appointment of additional magistrates, in lieu of
judges, in response to the expanding caseload in the Southern District of New York, and
noted that most judges and magistrates agreed. See S.D.N.Y. Magistrate System, supra note
17, at 37. The reasons proffered include limited physical plant, preservation of collegiality
and consensus among judges, cost, and a congressional preference for magistrates. id. at
41. But note that Article III concerns presently limit the use that some Southern District
judges make of magistrates. Id. at 26.
One serious objection to predictions of mass reference is the prospect that judicial work-
loads will stabilize with the recent addition of 117 new district judgeships. See Omnibus
Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 47 U.S.L.W. 81-82 (1978). Despite this act, how-
ever, the long-term risk of caseload-induced mass reference remains. A second wave of
additional judgeships is unlikely. See H.R. REP. 1364, suPra note 1, at 21 (judiciary cannot
be expanded indefinitely). Further, the risk of widespread delegation persists even if the
expanding workload assumption is dropped. Judges may wish to spend more time on
fewer cases, and magistrates may effectively lobby for expanded judicial responsibilities.
Cf. note 184 infra (magistrate career prospect improved by display of judicial skills).
The 1979 consensual reference provision itself may suggest other objections to predic-
tions of mass reference. Litigants who benefit from delay will have an incentive to reject
reference, see note 148 infra; litigants who desire circuit court review as of right may
insist on a judicial trial, see note 3 supra; and the 1979 House bill-unlike its Senate
counterpart-would constrain reference practices by the requirement of case-by-case ref-
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Both the addition of magistrates and the multiplication of references
are likely to be low-visibility, evolutionary processes that do not entail
any sudden break with established district court practices. 145 Moreover,
both processes will always be in the short-term interests of judges and
litigants alike. Each decision to refer a case to a magistrate will pit the
parties' or the court's pressing momentary needs against amorphous
Article III concerns about the aggregate level of delegations. 14
The most straightforward problem posed by the risk of widespread
delegation is also the most long range: the aggregate denial of Article
III hearings to large numbers of federal litigants. Unlike the depriva-
tion analyzed by the Wedding Court, 147 this denial will appear illusory
on the individual level, since any litigant tapped by the district court
for reference might choose instead to "purchase" a constitutional judge
by accepting the attendant waiting costs and forcing his adversary to
do likewise.148 Yet, on an institutional level, the denial will assume a
tangible form as district courts plan on magistrate reference of a grow-
ing percentage of their caseload, and these expectations are reflected
in Administrative Office projections and budgetary requests. In high-
reference districts, the provision of Article III judges for all litigants
will become a sheer impossibility, since a constriction of references
would force mushrooming case-flow backups and waiting periods that
would seem unacceptable relative both to participant expectations and
to the value of litigation itself. Moreover, as reference becomes routine,
mass delegation may lose a portion of its consensual character on the
individual level as well. The 1979 Act explicitly seeks to insulate
litigants from judicial prodding to consent to reference, 4 9 but the Act's
erence consideration, see 1979 House Bill § 2(2). Yet the effect of each of these factors
is arguable. Individualized reference decisions can be made in summary fashion if courts
develop de facto reference policies. See pp. 1054-55 infra. In addition, a group of litigants
who always demanded district judges would make judges less accessible to other litigants,
but would have no necessary effect on the overall volume of references.
145. The most important factor regulating these processes may be the pace at which
new magistrates are added to district courts. See note 144 supra.
146. The process may feed on itself. The more routinized consensual reference becomes,
the more legitimate it will seem; and the more successfully it absorbs caseload increases,
the less urgent and politically viable alternate solutions to overcrowding may be. See note
142 supra (citing sources).
147. See pp. 1041-47 supra.
148. Speedy trial by magistrate often favors one of the adverse parties (usually the
plaintiff in civil actions) by accelerating relief. See Comment, supra note 39, at 597-98. A
party benefiting from delay has a double incentive to decline reference: he both retains
an Article III judge and postpones the risk of losing. Id. The 1979 Act would bar attempts
to equalize reference incentives. See note 149 infra.
149. The 1979 House bill authorizes the court clerk to inform litigants of the option
of magistrate trial and to receive their responses. 1979 House Bill § 2(2). It further
provides: "No district judge shall be informed of the parties' response to this notice, nor
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protections have yet to be tested in a pressured environment where
reference is perceived by all participants to be the norm rather than
the exception. 50
Even without judicial coercion,' 5 ' however, routinization and ex-
pansion of consensual reference must eventually come to violate Article
III constraints. 52 It would be impossible to reconcile magistrate ad-
judication of the bulk of a district court's civil caseload either with the
policies of the tenure and salary provisions' 53 or with the mandate vest-
ing ultimate decisionmaking power in the Article III judiciary. 154 Such
an outcome wodld vitiate the features of consensual reference that
justify a relaxed delegation policy by reducing consent to a formality. 55
Still more important, routine, mass reference would entirely sever the
linkage in the district courts between the Article III guarantees of office
and the courts' jurisdictional field, 56 and thus lead to the very out-
shall he attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil
matter to a magistrate." Id. The 1979 Senate bill offers a similar blind consent procedure.
See 1979 Senate Bill § 2(2).
150. The blind consent procedure offered by the 1979 Act seems well-designed to
insulate the parties. Its only potential flaw may be the fact that district judges would
know which cases had been selected for reference, since they would participate in the
selection process. See 1979 Act § 2(2). In some instances, disparate party interests or
ability to bear waiting costs might suggest which litigant refused the reference invitation.
The danger of tainting judicial neutrality would be particularly great when one party
was suspected of delaying tactics. Cf. United States v. Baer, 575 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (10th
Cir. 1978) (Doyle, J., dissenting) (lawyer who received two $50 fines, two 30-day suspended
sentences, and two years' probation for parking tickets and "gamesmanship" was punished
for exercising right to trial of minor offenses before Article III judge). Compare the 1979
Act blind consent procedure with that proposed by Silberman, supra note 19, at 1359-60
(magistrate explores party willingness to consent off record).
151. In civil cases consent might also become a leverage tool between parties.
152. There is no standard for determining when longrun expansion of the sheer
volume of references might violate Article III constraints. Indeed, this difficulty of line-
drawing compounds the risks of widespread reference, for it suggests an almost insuper-
able obstacle to judicial development and enforcement of limitations on expansion of
consensual reference. The Article III concerns associated with expansion alone have at
least two dimensions. One is that a gradual institutional metamorphosis accompanying
expansion will erode the safeguard of litigant consent through a process of routinization.
See pp. 1049-50 supra. A second dimension is the weakening of the Article III judicial
office as a meaningful institutional protection, regardless of litigant behavior or attitudes.
Together, the two dimensions of Article III concern might induce most observers to agree
that constitutional values were jeopardized at some point along the vector of expanding
reference; yet there may be little agreement about when the turning point is reached.
The evolutionary character of the process of expansion and the likelihood that conditions
might vary dramatically from district to district make agreement still less probable.
153. See note 63 supra.
154. See note 74 supra.
155. If a small proportion of judicial time were devoted to civil cases, attempts by
significant numbers of new litigants to obtain judicial hearings would be deterred by
steeply rising waiting costs. Thus consent could not operate to exclude low-quality magis-
trates, very little of the onus of the reference decision would be shifted to the litigants,
and the litigants' right to a judicial hearing would become a mere formality.
156. See pp. 1037-38 supra.
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come that the distinction between jurisdictional transfer and delegation
constraints sought to avoid: a total collapse of Article III.157
Yet well before this point is reached, routinized consensual reference
might aggravate weaknesses already endemic to the magistrate system.
Two categories of problems were identified during congressional hear-
ings in 1977 and 1978:158 discrimination among classes of litigants,5 9
and "role problems" stemming from the complicated working relation-
ship between magistrates and district judges.'60
Critics of the 1979 Act's precursors located the discrimination prob-
lem in the prospect that trial by magistrate might be reserved for classes
of cases brought predominantly by poor litigants' 61-a fear that found
ample support in the legislative history of the original Senate draft of
the Act. 162 Recognizing the danger that the magistrate might become a
0c 04" $poor people's' " judge, 63 the 1979 House bill incorporates a pro-
cedure requiring case-by-case reference decisions. 64 This remedy bars
formal discrimination through wholesale reference by district court
rule and helps to ensure that district courts will not stigmatize cate-
gories of litigants as undeserving of the attention of Article III judges.
In addition, the strong language of the 1978 House Report 6 5 would
157. See H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 38 (dissenting views of Reps. Drinan and
Kindness):
The weakness of the logic of those who argue that consent cures all may be seen
when carried to its inevitable conclusion. Under the consent theory, Congress could
abolish all inferior Federal courts . .. and replace them with a greatly expanded
magistrate system. Litigants who desired a Federal forum would then only have to
consent to appear before the magistrate in order to have their cases adjudicated. If
one did not like the Federal magistrate system, then one could sue in the State
courts.... It is inconceivable that Congress could so easily escape the life-tenure and
undiminished compensation strictures of Article III ....
158. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 11.
159. See note 161 infra (citing sources).
160. See note 179 infra (citing sources).
161. See, e.g., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 62-63, 122-24 (Rep. Drinan); id.
at 54-55 (statement of Thomas Ehrlich); id. at 138 (statement of Pamela Horowitz); cf.
Legal Services Corporation, Preliminary Comments on Legislation Proposed by the Justice
Department to Expand the Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates (Mar. 15, 1977)
(criticizing early Justice Department proposal for magistrate adjudication of social
security, black lung, and related benefit matters) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Com-
ments].
162. See, e.g., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Att'y Gen. Bell);
S. REP. 344, supra note 137, at 1 (purpose of S. 1613, 1979 Act's precursor, is to expand
magistrate jurisdiction and improve access to courts for "less-advantaged").
163. H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 13.
164. 1979 House Bill § 2(2).
165. H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 13:
If a magistrate is competent to handle any case-dispositive jurisdiction, he should be
fully competent to handle all case-dispositive jurisdiction. [Individualized reference]
preserves the generalist posture of the magistrate, as well as insures that .... certain
disfavored cases are not routinely referenced to less-able judicial personnel or that
there is an impetus to appoint "specialized" magistrates to handle only narrow types
of cases. It thus prevents the creation of so-called "poor people's" courts.
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guarantee that judges will not restrict references solely to disadvantaged
litigants if the House measure were to prevail. Despite these substantial
improvements, however, the House has not cured the discrimination
problem altogether.106 The structure of the consensual-reference provi-
sion still points toward simple cases and needy litigants,167 and the
1978 House Report itself suggests systematic distinctions by targeting
"cases which do not require those special attributes of article III
judges" as appropriate candidates for reference. 68
Poor litigants, moreover, are not the only potential victims of dis-
criminatory reference practices, for any systematic caseload division
introduces invidious distinctions that may work to the detriment of a
particular portion of the court's jurisdiction, even when it aids in-
dividual parties.0 9 One danger is inhibiting collective judicial ex-
ploration of affected areas of law. Magistrate opinions possess very low
visibility. Not only are they presently unpublished, 170 but even if
publicly available they would lack the precedential weight of decisions
by district judges. The expansion of magistrate jurisdiction over a
progressively larger portion of district court jurisdiction might only
discourage judicial scrutiny of the precedential implications of routine
reference decisions; it would not alter the perceived "informal" char-
166. See id. at 42 (dissenting view of Rep. Holtzman).
167. Litigants with the strongest incentive to accept magistrate trial are those with low
stakes, simple cases (low adjudicator risk), and little ability to bear waiting costs.
168. H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 12.
169. A general problem accompanying consensual reference is an unequal division of
judicial resources. Under the 1979 Act, most magistrate cases would receive truncated
review. See note 3 supra (review procedure under 1979 Act). In addition, magistrates lack
the prestige, authority, and experience of district judges. See note 18 suPra (contrasting
magistrates and judges). At present, for example, much of the estimated 50% saving that
would result from the use of magistrates in lieu of judges stems from differential support
services. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 502-03 (memorandum on estimated
costs of S. 1613). Thus, consensual reference accelerates justice only in part by expanding
"judicial resources." In part, consensual reference merely reallocates resources by giving
more to those who wait, and giving it more quickly by encouraging the exit of those who
do not wait. This reallocation may be insignificant to litigants whose primary concern is
speedy justice. As reference expands, however, magistrates may begin to hear cases brought
by litigants who would prefer trial before an Article III judge but cannot afford the
waiting costs.
170. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 67 (statement of Thomas Ehrlich);
1977 Senate Hearings, suPra note 11, at 142 (statement of Charles Halpern). Both argued
that publication of magistrate opinions would alleviate inhibition of legal development
in areas in which magistrates hear a high proportion of cases. Paradoxically, when the
magistrate serves as a judicial adviser under the recommended-disposition procedure, the
likelihood of publication of a major opinion under the imprimatur of a district judge
may be greater than when the magistrate assumes the full judicial function under the
1979 Act. Cf. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 2-7 (D. Conn. 1978) (adopting
Magistrate Arthur H. Latimer's recommended disposition of motion to dismiss) (reprinted
magistrate opinion establishes student right of action under Title IX for sexual harass-
ment in private university).
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acter' 71 of individual magistrate opinions or the status disparity be-
tween magistrates and judges. In addition, the 1979 Act would com-
pound the impact of widespread consensual reference by channelling
most appeals of magistrate decisions away from authoritative review in
the circuit courts.
1'7 2
The potential discriminatory effects of widespread reference also
underscore the quasi-jurisdictional nature of reference policies, and
thus raise the related issue of whether the courts are the appropriate
institution for developing such policies. 1'7 3 If litigant consent arguably
relieves courts of most responsibility for individual reference deci-
sions,-74 it cannot sanction aggregate-level reference policies. Yet, short
of randomly allocating reference invitations among litigants, courts
must develop reference policies in order to answer the basic value
questions' 75 posed by two classes of potential adjudicators-questions
that would grow more acute as reference became commonplace.' 7
171. Cf. H.R. REP. 1364, suPra note 1, at 12 (parties may desire less formal adjudication
offered by magistrates).
172. 1979 Act § 2(2). Circuit court review as of right is available only on special litigant
agreement. 1979 House Bill § 2(2) (agreement required prior to final magistrate judg-
ment); 1979 Senate Bill § 2(2) (agreement required at time of magistrate reference). This
provision ensures that most appeals from magistrate decisions would be to district judges,
with possible review by a circuit court only on petition for a writ of certiorari. 1979 Act
§ 2(2). Thus, most litigants before magistrates benefit from a relatively inexpensive
review procedure in the district court, but sacrifice the right to a more authoritative-and
institutionally removed-appeal.
173. See note 82 sup ra.
174. See p. 1048 supra.
175. A hypothetical may illustrate the value questions. Consider the reference choice
between a factually complex antitrust matter, involving large damage claims, and an
unusually simple, individual Title VII action. Cf. Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d
1378, 1380 (7th Cir. 1974) (vacating decision reached following magistrate trial and
recommended disposition, despite local rule sanctioning reference of Title VII matters;
action alleged racially motivated discharge). Size, complexity, amount at stake, and possible
economic ramifications caution against the antitrust reference. Cf. La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957) (complexity of antitrust matters is reason for judicial
trial). Yet potential savings of judicial time, coupled with the routine factual character of
many issues, sophistication of counsel, and likelihood of appeal, argue in favor of the
antitrust reference. By contrast, the relative simplicity and low monetary value of the
Title VII action weigh in favor of reference, while its symbolic importance and possible
constitutional dimensions seem to demand a judicial statement. Decision between these
cases would be difficult on administrative grounds alone. Once other values are introduced,
the choice necessarily assumes an ideological dimension as well. The 1979 Senate bill
would permit advance resolution of the dilemma through local court rules-a solution
that extends or withholds reference invitations without regard for the factual peculiarities
of cases. See note 3 supra. The 1979 House bill would both require an individualized
decision and discourage reference solely on the basis of litigant need. See id.; pp. 1052-53
supra. Yet the absence of guidelines or restrictions would only make individual reference
decisions more difficult and apparently arbitrary.
176. If decisions proceeded on a case-by-case basis, commonplace reference would soon
exhaust the pool of "easy" cases-those for which extreme simplicity, litigant need, or
other unusual factors made the reference decision obvious. If decisions proceeded on a
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Thus, even the House bill, which mandates case-by-case reference, 177
might not diminish the likelihood of de facto reference policies. Under
either version of the 1979 Act, then, the courts, rather than Congress,
are left to supply the fundamental reference values and hence assume
authority over a key element of jurisdictional policy.178
The second group of systemic difficulties associated with consensual
reference includes role problems arising from the magistrate's dual
position as judicial subordinate and independent adjudicator. The
congressional hearings in 1977 and 1978 focused primarily on the cir-
cumscribed problem of the district judge's ability to review with detach-
ment the decisions of his own appointee and colleague. 179 However,
the converse role problem of magistrate independence in relation to
district judges is more sensitive on traditional Article III grounds and
is also less amenable to procedural solution. 80
The premise of the 1979 consensual-reference provision is that
litigant consent permits the magistrate to assume the full judicial
function.' 8 ' The integrity of magistrate decisions is insulated by the
category-by-category basis through local court rules, even initial choices would be difficult.
Cf. Preliminary Comments, supra note 161, at 6-9 (arguing against widespread delegation
of apparently simple social security cases on grounds that many entail complex legal de-
terminations, that judicial monitoring of agency performance may be weakened, and that
agency officials are less likely to defer to magistrate decisions).
177. See 1979 House Bill § 2(2).
178. See note 82 suPra (quasi-jurisdictional nature of reference policy); note 175 supra
(hypothetical illustrating reference values).
179. See, e.g., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 174 (Rep. Ertel); 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 11, at 153 (statement of Att'y Gen. Bell).
180. See H.R. REP. 1364, supra note I, at 15-16 (parties may avoid review by "'tainted'
district judge" through agreement to seek circuit court review or through affidavit alleging
bias that prompts reassignment to another district judge). As a showing of bias may be
both difficult and awkward, however, a consensual request for circuit review may be the
only workable alternative. But see note 172 supra (most litigants selecting magistrate trial
would receive district court review).
181. But the 1979 Act does not contemplate a complete overlap of magistrate and
judicial roles. Compare H.R. REP. 1364, sukra note 1, at 12 (parties may desire less formal
adjudication offered by magistrates) with id. at 13 (if magistrate competent to handle any
case, he should be competent to handle all cases). Thus there is a tension at the core of
the 1979 Act between treating the magistrate as the functional equal of the judge and
portraying the option of magistrate trial as a novel judicial service. It is a tension forced
by the administrative arguments offered in support of the Act. If the magistrate is to
offer a novel form of adjudication-less formal, speedier, and without the range of con-
stitutional safeguards accompanying trial before a district judge-then consensual reference
meets the need of a subset of litigants who neither require nor deserve the full district
court services that they have previously received, for lack of alternatives. See id. at 12
("[t]here are cases which do not require those special attributes of Article III judges, but
nonetheless do require an impartial generalist"). In this case, the magistrate could hardly
be criticized for differing from the district judge, since his very differences are the raison
d'etre of consensual reference.
But widespread reference can be faulted on other grounds. The provision of informal
justice is far removed from the traditional functions of the Article III courts. See pp.
1032-33 supra. The longrun risk that consensual reference will expand beyond the inde-
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same standard of review that safeguards judicial decisionmaking, 2
Yet the magistrate is not a judge. In addition to the familiar "control"
of appellate review that all higher federal tribunals exercise over the
judges of lower courts, the magistrate is also subject to a qualitatively
different form of bureaucratic control that may attend district court
authority to determine his reappointment prospects and, more impor-
tantly, the day-to-day contents of his docket.'8 3 Moreover, district judges
must evaluate the magistrate's decisional record in the course of ex-
ercising their administrative functions, if only in order to maintain the
standards of the court. This ongoing, informal oversight creates the
risk of impermissible intrusion on the magistrate's substantive decisions.
The danger is not that magistrates will come to function as judicial
alter egos, but rather that they may be encouraged to adopt a risk-averse
strategy of adjudication by the pressure of judicial scrutiny, 8 4 a strategy
terminate class of appropriate reference candidates may be large. See pp. 1048-52 supra.
Finally, it is by no means clear that magistrate adjudication differs enough from judicial
trial. A need for informality, speed, and economy might better be served by entirely novel
institutions outside the Article III courts; for example, large-scale, federally subsidized
arbitration permitting appeal to the Article III courts, or, when appropriate, administra-
tive agency fact-finding and initial adjudication.
By contrast, when the magistrate is represented as the full equal of the district judge,
consensual reference can be offered as a solution for a different set of problems: chronically
overcrowded dockets and temporary peaks in demand for judicial services, see H.R. REP.
1364, supra note I, at 27; the legitimate needs of disadvantaged litigants for access to
traditional district court adjudication, see S. REP. 344, supra note 137, at 1; and even the
high costs of judicial services, see note 142 supra. In this case, however, widespread con-
sensual reference is only a partial substitute for reforms that might expand the avail-
ability-or decrease the workload-of the Article III judiciary itself. See 1977 House
Hearings, supra note 4, at 127 (remarks of Judge Metzner responding to Rep. Drinan)
(judicial determination of all federal court matters preferable to magistrate adjudication,
but infeasible given congressional reluctance to furnish funds); H.R. RFP. 1364, supra
note 1, at 35 (dissenting views of Reps. Drinan and Kindness) (bills to create additional
judgeships and abolish diversity jurisdiction lessen need for S. 1613, 1979 Act's precursor).
In addition, criticisms of the 1979 Act that focus on role problems, see p. 1057 infra,
and the distribution of judicial resources, see pp. 1052-54 supra, are particularly telling if
the underlying rationale for consensual reference hinges on the need to expand the exist-
ing services offered by Article III judges.
182. 1979 Act § 2(2).
183. 1979 House Bill § 2(2) (magistrate must be "specially designated" to try civil cases);
1979 Senate Bill § 2(2) (magistrate must be "specially designated" to try cases and court
may always vacate references on its own motion or on showing of good cause). See S. REP.
344, suPra note 137, at 11 (magistrate reference jurisdiction limited by judicial approval
so that court may "assure itself that an individual magistrate is fully qualified to try cases
and that the magistrate's performance of his other duties will not be unduly impeded");
1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 507 (letter from Dennis Sweeney) (magistrate con-
sensual reference jurisdiction may be withdrawn at any time). In addition to control over
the magistrate's authority to hear civil cases, the 1979 Act would also permit the district
judges to shape the magistrate's docket by regulating which cases may be heard. See 1979
Act § 2(2).
184. This danger reflects solely on the magistrate's difficult role. Cf. Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, Benjamin Cardozo Lecture, Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (Nov. 1, 1978) ("A judge who feels threatened by the perception that other
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eschewing unconventional decisions that might otherwise be prompted
by novel legal claims or by pressing factual idiosyncracies. Such "ju-
dicious" decisionmaking would be inconsistent with the premise that
the magistrate is capable of serving as the functional equivalent of the
judge.'15 It would be equally inconsistent with the broader policy of
autonomous adjudication within the federal courts that underlies the
Article III judicial office.'
86
Beyond the pressures on magistrate decisions, however, lies the more
general problem of role confusion in the public eye.'8 7 The fungibility
of judge and magistrate implied by widespread consensual reference
would shift the basis of the federal judge's perceived legitimacy away
from a specific constitutional mandate and toward a pragmatic view
of the work of the judiciary as merely another essential public service.
Yet judges who invoke the Constitution daily and depend on it for
their power to check the other branches of government can ill afford
an erosion of public respect for their unique constitutional qualifica-
tions. 88
Analysis of consensual reference thus reveals multiple difficulties at-
judges are looking over his shoulder, not to decide whether to reverse him but to consider
the possibility of discipline, will perform his work with a timidity and awkwardness
damaging to the decisional process.") As a day-to-day judicial subordinate, the magistrate
is in a still more vulnerable position. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 507
(letter from Dennis Sweeney). In addition, under the 1979 Act the magistrate may be
subject to market pressures from litigants-pressures that motivate competent and neutral
performance, but that may also encourage risk-averse decisionmaking. See 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 11, at 223 (Arthur L. Burnett, Federal Bar Association representative
and former magistrate):
[C]onsent could be a strong motivating factor for superior performance by the ambi-
tious magistrate who views his role and function as perhaps a training ground ...
for consideration for appointment to the U.S. district court or the U.S. court of
appeals bench.
Should a magistrate prove to be incompetent, inefficient, or injudicious ... the
parties and their lawyers will not consent to the handling of either civil or criminal
matters before that judicial officer.
If the magistrate wishes to impress observers of his judicial ability and tempera-
ment.., he will strive to do his best in handling every possible case.
Ironically, the magistrate's close relationship with the several judges of a district court
might allow a strong magistrate to be extremely influential in shaping district court policy
toward individual legal issues. Such influence on legal issues across cases must, however,
be distinguished from the full adjudication of individual cases. Indeed, the magistrate's
legal influence may be greater as adviser than as independent adjudicator. See note 170
sukra.
185. Cf. Kaufman, supra note 60, at 712-15 (judicial independence and individualism
critical to federal judge's role). But see note 181 supra (insofar as 1979 Act also intends
magistrate to serve as novel, informal adjudicator, consensual reference eludes comparison
of magistrates and judges).
186. See note 63 supra.
187. See H.R. REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 37 (dissenting views of Reps. Drinan and
Kindness).
188. See id. at 38.
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tending the magistrate's piecemeal elevation to the functional equal of
the district judge-difficulties even more complex than the Wedding
problem of ensuring that the magistrate remains the functional sub-
ordinate of the judge. The two levels of problems are complementary;
together they suggest that hierarchical relations between individual ad-
judicators, no matter how structured, will always prove less compatible
with the policies behind the Article III judicial office than the tradi-
tional "hierarchical system of courts, not of judges."'18 9
III. The Proper Legislative Constraints on Trial by Magistrate
The proposed expansion of the magistrate's civil jurisdiction in the
1979 Act threatens to trigger a profound structural change in the
federal courts. 190 The system's past record of rapid growth and its
potential for uncontrolled future development are more disturbing
than any one of its individual problems. In part, the system's dynamism
testifies to its success in meeting the pressing day-to-day needs of over-
crowded district courts. The magistrate's service as a judicial assistant,
particularly in the pretrial arena, has made substantial contributions
to district court efficiency.19 Most of these gains have been achieved
without offsetting constitutional risks. 92 Nevertheless, even the magis-
trate's advisory role is not free of Article III problems. Although rec-
ommended disposition is now well-established, Wedding cautions that
acceptance of magistrate evidentiary hearings on prisoner petitions en-
tails a continuing risk of impermissible delegation, a risk that also im-
pinges on federalism concerns in the case of state prisoners. Now, how-
ever, the 1979 Act proposes the magistrate's formal promotion to the
role of independent adjudicator in the face of constitutional difficulties
less amenable to judicial resolution than the already difficult task of
delimiting the magistrate's role as a judicial assistant.
The juxtaposition of old problems and the proposed 1979 legisla-
tion points to one context in which consensual reference might be used
to strengthen existing procedures: namely, in the disposition of prisoner
petitions that reach the evidentiary hearing stage. Ideally, litigant con-
sent would supplement the safeguard of "de novo" district court re-
189. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 218 (1928); cf.
Kaufman, supra note 60, at 711-12 (formal judicial peer review threatens complementary
qualities of collegiality and individualism that characterize quasi-academic functioning of
federal judicial community).
190. See pp. 1049-50 suPra.
191. See S.D.N.Y. Magistrate System, supra note 17.
192. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268-73 (1976).
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view' 98 that now accompanies magistrate hearings. Consent would de-
fuse federalism objections to magistrate hearings by preserving state
access to a full determination of factual issues before an Article III
judge. Similarly, consent recognizes the interests of prisoners in a
judicial hearing and provides a remedy for Wedding's lingering sus-
picion of possible de facto delegation.194 Yet, because a supplemental
consent requirement might face strenuous administrative objectionis,' 9
a less satisfactory alternative also merits consideration: final magistrate
disposition of prisoner petitions on a consensual basis.' 96 Full con-
sensual reference retains the virtues of supplemental consent; it miti-
gates existing federalism problems and responds to Wedding's con-
cerns by allowing magistrate adjudication in a form that poses minimal
Article III risks. However, final magistrate disposition would also in-
troduce novel problems. It would entail the loss of the 1976 de novo
review procedure as well as the addition of the weaknesses inherent in
any system of consensual reference-risk of coerced consent, role prob-
lems, and possible inhibition of legal development. These drawbacks
must be balanced against corresponding problems in the existing
recommended-disposition procedure. 197  Ultimately, the choice may
hinge on the equally uncertain merits of allowing parties to safeguard
factual determinations beforehand through the right to a judicial hear-
ing, or of continuing to rely on judicial redetermination of all con-
tested factual matters despite Wedding's reservation. 98
193. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976); see note 32 sukra (discussing "de novo" review).
194. Consent may also lessen any residual due process problems with magistrate habeas
hearings that remain after Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977). See note 120 sukra
(discussing Pressley's presumption of competency to decide habeas petitions).
195. Cf. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 29 (statement of Peter McCabe)
(magistrates vigorously press for elimination of defendant-waiver requirement prior to
magistrate trial of petty offenses). Note also that consensual magistrate hearings on
prisoner petitions were proposed immediately following the Wedding decision. See Com-
ment, supra note 112, at 356-58.
196. Consensual reference and final magistrate disposition of prisoner petitions are not
addressed by legislative materials accompanying either the 1979 Senate or House bills.
However, since prisoner petitions are civil matters, they may be eligible for reference. See
note 3 supra (1979 consensual-reference provision).
197. The risk of coerced consent attending consensual reference seems preferable to
mandatory reference of prisoner hearings under the recommended-disposition procedure.
Role problems accompanying the two procedures might be similar despite the differing
formal characterizations of magistrate functions that they entail. See note 127 supra;
pp. 1056-57 supra. The most telling drawback of consensual reference might be the
diversion of judicial attention away from prisoner petitions that would be occasioned by
replacement of de novo review with an ordinary appellate review procedure.
198. Empirical investigation of magistrate reversal on factual issues under the present
de novo appeals procedure, see note 32 supra, might shed light on the dangers of in-
troducing final magistrate determination subject to conventional appellate review. It
should also be noted that appeals under a conventional appellate procedure might entail
greater delay. See id. (under 1976 Amendments parties have 10 days to request de novo
determination of disputed issues).
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If full consensual reference of prisoner petitions receives considera-
tion, however, it should not emerge as an application of an omnibus
consensual-reference provision, 199 but as an independent legislative
proposal. In this form it would escape the interpretative difficulties
generated by the original 1968 Act.2 0 0 Still more important, it would
remain within the confines of a limited congressional value determina-
tion, and thus avoid both the nagging issues that surround judicial
exercises of quasi-jurisdictional authority201 and the danger of a long-
run dynamic of expanding delegation.
The problems that consensual reference eludes in the case of prisoner
petitions-or any other single class of matters-are far less easily avoided
by legislation that would permit magistrate reference across the juris-
dictional field. Article III risks as well as separation-of-powers concerns
suggest that the House and Senate Judiciary Committees might wisely
reassess present drafts of the 1979 consensual-reference provision. More-
over, the case for reconsideration is particularly compelling because
pressures on district court dockets may be less acute in the near future
than in any previous phase of the magistrate system's development. 202
Congressional reassessment, however, should look to revision rather
than rejection of the 1979 consensual-reference provision. The drafting
challenge is to minimize the risks accompanying a procedure that, even
without express statutory authorization, is already established in some
districts.20 3 Thus, revision of the 1979 House and Senate bills should
firmly restrict prospects for future expansion of magistrate reference..
20 4
199. See note 196 supra. Calls for final magistrate determination of prisoner petitions
date from the beginnings of the magistrate system itself. See Note, Proposed Reformation
of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Federal Magistrates, 54 IowA L. REv. 1147,
1157-63 (1969) (advocating bankruptcy model for magistrate disposition of habeas petitions).
200. See p. 1042 supra (1968 Act's permissive umbrella clause and restrictive illustra-
tion in habeas area).
201. See pp. 1035-39 supra (quasi-jurisdictional character of reference decisionmaking).
202. The recent creation of 117 additional district judgeships should do much to relieve
short-term pressures on the district courts. See Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-486, 47 U.S.L.W. 81-82 (1978). Possible reintroduction of legislation to curtail
diversity jurisdiction may further relieve overcrowding. Cf. note 59 suPra (recent efforts
to curtail diversity jurisdiction). Until the effects of these reforms are known, even the
administrative grounds for expanded magistrate jurisdiction remain open to question.
See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 216 (Judge Friendly); H.R. REP. 1364, supra
note 1, at 35-36, 41 (dissenting views of Reps. Drinan, Kindness, and Seiberling). But see
id. at 21-22 (diversity curtailment, additional judgeships, and expanded magistrate juris-
diction are complementary reforms).
203. See note 4 supra (consensual reference without express statutory authorization).
204. Even restrictive regulation would permit some expansion of consensual reference
as the majority of districts that have hitherto hesitated to permit any magistrate trials
adjust to the new guidelines. Indeed, short-term congressional projections of the 1979
Act's impact, see note 6 supra, rest primarily on expected increases in magistrate trials in
districts that have not previously allowed them.
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In addition, it should relieve the judiciary of responsibility for de-
termining either the appropriate levels of aggregate reference or the
criteria that should inform reference decisions. A range of statutory
provisions might serve both objectives. One possibility is the creation
of fixed, maximum delegation rates coupled with conservative reference
procedures-for example, a requirement that parties initiate the ref-
erence process by filing a joint request for magistrate trial.20 5 A second
alternative might be to borrow the exceptional-condition language
from the special master tradition,20 but leave to the litigants the
burden of overcoming a presumption in favor of judicial trial. Finally,
a third option might be congressional specification of individual cate-
gories of cases that are appropriate for magistrate trial.
20 7
Conclusion
Any expansion of magistrate jurisdiction that risks widespread, rou-
tine delegation within the district courts also threatens a serious erosion
of the policies underlying the Article III judicial office. Neither Con-
gress nor the courts should allow the administrative conveniences of
reference to obscure this danger. The answer, however, is not prohibi-
tion of all magistrate adjudication. Instead, legislation should respond
by introducing a consent requirement in those cases, such as prisoner
petitions requiring evidentiary hearings, in which the magistrate's ad-
visory role might informally extend to de facto adjudication, and by
carefully restricting the number and kinds of matters in which the
magistrate may formally assume the full judicial function.
205. Shifting reference initiative to the parties has several advantages. It highlights the
unusual character of reference, protects against judicial pressure (or perceived pressure),
relieves the judiciary of most burdens of the reference decision, and lessens the utility of
reference as a docket-clearing device.
206. See note 23 supra.
207. Cf. note 82 suPra (reference decisionmaking entails resolution of basic quasi-juris-
dictional value issues traditionally resting with Congress). But see S. REP. 344, supra note
137, at 4 (rejecting, because of Congress's lack of experience, suggestion that specific
categories of cases be designated for reference). Congressional designation of categories of
cases for reference would, of course, discriminate among cases-but with the crucial dif-
ference that it would also force Congress to make value decisions that are too important
to rest on administrative convenience and too arbitraty for judicial determination. Lack of
experience is one reason for hesitating to make such designations. The sensitivity demon-
strated by the House Judiciary Committee to the prospect of systematic reference of
"poor people's" cases suggests a second reason: the inherent difficulty of prescribing
reference values on the concrete level of deciding among categories of cases. See H.R.
REP. 1364, supra note 1, at 13. This inherent difficulty, however, is also a persuasive
reason for congressional determination of reference policy. The performance of the House
Judiciary Committee previews the care with which Congress might fashion a specific
reference policy. Congressional designation of too many categories of cases for possible
reference would, of course, replicate the expansionist dangers of present drafts of the 1979
Act
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